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Résumé 
Introduction: En réponse aux exigences du gouvernement fédéral en ce qui 
concerne les temps d'attente pour les chirurgies électives d’hanche et du genou, les 
Organismes Canadiens de santé ont adopté des stratégies de gestion pour les listes 
d'attente. Cependant, il n'existe pas actuellement aucune information disponible 
concernant les effets imprévus, positive ou négative, de ces stratégies. 
Méthodologie: Un modèle qui a été construit est tombé en panne la gestion de la 
chirurgie d’hanche et du genou en différentes étapes, afin d'identifier les effets 
imprévus possibles pour chaque étape; le modèle a été validé auprès d'un panel 
d'experts. Cette étude a choisi quatre études de cas en fonction de leur durabilité: 
un cas qui a été durable, un cas qui a été modérément durable, et deux cas peu 
probable d'être durable. Dans cette étude qualitative, nous avons mené 31 
entretiens semi-structurés entre Novembre 2010 et Juin 2011 avec les 
gestionnaires, les infirmières, les thérapeutes et les chirurgiens impliqués dans la 
gestion des stratégies du temps d’attente  pour les chirurgies électives d’hanche et 
du genou. Les quatre cas ont été sélectionnés à partir de trois provinces / régions. 
Nous avons analysé les conséquences non intentionnelles aux niveaux systémique 
et organisationnelle en utilisant les stratégies dans chaque contexte.  
Enregistrements des entrevues ont été transcrits mot à mot et soumis à l'analyse du 
cadre. 
Résultats: Les effets négatifs sont la précarité des stratégies en raison du non-
récurrente financement,  l'anxiété chez les patients qui ne sont pas prêts pour la 
chirurgie, une redistribution du temps de chirurgie vers l’orthopédie au détriment 
des autres interventions chirurgicales, tensions entre les chirurgiens et entre les 
orthopédistes et anesthésistes, et la pression sur le personnel dans le bloc 
opératoire et  postopératoire. 
Conclusion: La stratégie d’implémentation aux niveaux national et local devrait 
prendre en compte les conséquences potentielles, positives et négatives. Il y a des 
conséquences inattendues à chaque niveau de l'organisation des soins de santé. 
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Individuellement et collectivement, ces conséquences peuvent positivement et 
négativement affecter les résultats. Par conséquent, la planification de la santé doit 
analyser et prendre en compte les conséquences inattendues en termes de bonnes 
résultats inattendues, compromis et les conséquences négatives afin d'améliorer les 
résultats. 
Mots-clés: Conséquences inattendues, les bons résultats inattendus, les 
compromis, les conséquences négatives et les stratégies du temps d’attente.  
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Abstract 
Introduction: In response to federal government requirements regarding wait 
times for elective hip and knee surgeries, Canadian healthcare organizations have 
adopted wait list management strategies. However, there is currently no 
information available regarding the unanticipated effects, positive or negative, of 
these strategies.  
Methodology: A model was constructed that broke down the management of 
elective hip and knee surgery into different steps, in order to identify the 
unanticipated potential effects for each step; the model was validated with a panel 
of experts.	   This study chose four case studies based on their sustainability: one 
case that was sustainable, one case that was moderately sustainable, and two cases 
considered unlikely to be sustainable. In this qualitative study, we conducted 31 
semi-structured interviews between November 2010 and June 2011 with 
managers, nurses, therapists and surgeons involved in wait time management 
strategies for hip and knee surgeries. The four cases were selected from three 
provinces/areas. We analyzed potential unintended consequences at the systemic 
and organizational levels of using these strategies in each setting. Interview 
recordings were transcribed verbatim and subjected to framework analysis.  
Results: Negative effects were the strategies’ precariousness due to non-recurrent 
funding, anxiety in patients not ready for surgery, a redistribution of surgical time 
toward orthopaedics at the expense of other surgeries, tensions between surgeons 
and between orthopaedic surgeons and anaesthesiologists, and significant pressure 
on personnel in the operating suite and in post-operative care. 
Conclusions: Strategy implementation at the national and local levels should take 
into consideration any potential consequences, positive and negative. There are 
unintended consequences at each level of healthcare organization. Individually and 
jointly, these consequences can positively and negatively affect outcomes. 
Therefore, health planning should analyze and take into account unintended 
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consequences in terms of serendipities, trade-offs and negative consequences in 
order to improve results.  
Keywords: Unintended consequences, serendipities, trade-offs, negative 
consequences, wait time strategies. 
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Chapter 1 - Introduction 
In recent years, Canada’s federal ministers of health have sought to 
improve management of wait times and to reduce them when they are longer than 
medically acceptable. As a consequence, the federal government has significantly 
invested in hospitals and community services, financial resources and health 
professionals, under a 10-year plan to reduce wait times and to make healthcare 
more sustainable (Canada, 2004).  
While all provinces agree with the federal objectives, the province of 
Quebec decided to develop its own goals in terms of reducing wait times and 
improving access to healthcare.    
The federal 10-year plan addresses efforts to reduce wait times and to 
improve access to healthcare in several areas, specifically cancer, heart disease, 
diagnostic imaging, joint replacement, and sight restoration services. The federal 
government also created the Western Canada Waiting List (WCWL) to use clinical 
and research expertise to standardize priorities for select procedures: MRI 
scanning, children’s mental health, cataract surgery, general surgery, and hip and 
knee replacements. 
In response to federal government requirements regarding wait times for 
elective hip and knee replacement (HKR) surgery, healthcare organizations have 
adopted wait time management strategies (WTMS), and the provinces have 
focused on improving those strategies. However, there is currently no available 
information regarding the potential consequences of implementing these strategies 
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in Canadian healthcare organizations. The author’s aim in this thesis is therefore to 
elucidate both the positive and negative effects of WTMS, specifically in the area 
of HKR surgeries. With a better understanding of these effects, policy-makers, 
managers and professionals may be better able to prevent or minimize the negative 
or unexpected consequences of WTMS. 
This thesis is based on empirical research focused on the unintended 
consequences of WTMS at the contextual and organizational levels in Canadian 
healthcare organizations.  
1.1 Research question 
This project’s general research question was: what are the unintended 
consequences of strategies implemented to shorten wait times for HKR surgeries 
at the contextual and organizational levels in Canada? 
It also looks to understand specific questions: what are the unintended 
consequences of using wait times strategies for HKR surgeries at the systemic and 
organizational level? 
What are the unintended consequences of the strategies used to reduce wait 
times for HKR surgeries at the prehospital, hospital and post-hospital levels? 
What are the unintended consequences of using wait times strategies for 
HKR surgeries on sustainable, moderately sustainable and unlikely to be 
sustainable organizations? 
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Chapter 2 - Literature Review   
2.1 Wait time management strategies: a literature review 
2.1.1 Definition of concepts 
This chapter explains the relevant and different concepts of wait time, wait 
list, and wait time management strategies. In addition, the determinants of both 
wait times and wait time management strategies are also presented. 
Timely access to elective surgery has been a significant challenge in 
Canada (Noseworthy, 2003) and other OECD countries (Bruni, Laupacis, 
Levinson, & Martin, 2010; MacCormick.AD, 2003; Siciliani & Hurst, 2003). Long 
wait times for procedures like HKR surgery have become a major issue in Canada 
(Conner-Spady, Johnston, Sanmartin, McGurran, & Noseworthy, 2007) and 
elsewhere (Hadorn & Holmes, 1997). Like Canada, six other OECD countries also 
have health policies focused specifically on improving wait times (Siciliani & 
Hurst, 2003).  
The literature identifies three different periods of wait times: waiting to see 
the specialist, waiting to receive hospital-based services, and total wait time. The 
period waiting for the specialist is measured from the moment the general 
practitioner (GP) makes the referral to the moment of the specialist consultation 
itself (Sanmartin, 2003). The period waiting for hospital-based services or surgery 
is measured from the time the surgeon and the patient decide to go forward with 
surgery to when the surgical procedure is completed. Finally, total wait time, 
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possibly the most meaningful measure, includes the first two periods (Masri et al., 
2005; Sanmartin, 2003).  
There literature describes two related concepts: wait time and wait list.  
Wait time is defined as the time elapsed from the date when a patient is added to 
the wait list for a procedure after specialist assessment to the date when he is 
admitted for the procedure. This definition does not include the elapsed time of the 
referral process, also known as the ‘outpatient waiting time’; Siciliani’s model 
describes likely determinants of variations in wait times (Siciliani & Hurst, 2003). 
Wait list is a “queue of patients who are deemed to need a health service that is in 
short supply relative to demand” (Hador & The Steering Committee of the 
Western Canada Waiting List Project, 2000).   
A Wait time management strategy (WTMS) is a strategy for reducing the 
amount of time spent waiting for access to healthcare services. To reduce wait 
lists, healthcare planners have drawn upon concepts from such areas as 
mathematics, industrial engineering, and operations research. Their redesign 
approach involves mapping out the patient’s journey of care (pathway) to uncover 
the bottlenecks that impede patient flow from one step to another. The main 
objective of WTMS is to improve capacity to deal with demand; in fact, capacity 
should be slightly greater than demand to allow the system enough flexibility to 
handle fluctuations in demand. WTMS include a variety of alternatives for 
shortening wait times: reducing complexity in the booking process, creating 
efficient methods of scheduling patients, reducing excess steps in the care 
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pathway, increasing the use of human resources, and improving appropriateness 
(Kreindler, 2008).  
Many governments and organizations have developed policies and 
strategies to improve wait times. Consequently, WTMS have been studied from 
different perspectives in many countries around the world (Bruni et al., 2010). 
Glynn identified the key elements of WTMS as being structure, knowledge, 
capacity, accountability, communication, and evaluation (Glynn, 2002). 
2.1.2 Types of measures of wait time 
In New Zealand, successive governments have sought to apply clinical and 
social criteria for reducing wait times. In fact, they have established health policies 
to implement WTMS by moving from wait lists to a booking system “where 
patients would know (within reasonable limits) when they would receive their 
operation through a clear and transparent process” (Hadorn & Holmes, 1997). 
They developed a scale to standardize priorities for patients waiting for HKR 
surgery (Hadorn & Holmes, 1997). In Canada, the federal government mandated 
the establishment of a benchmark to improve wait time in five areas including 
HKR surgery. The federal government benchmark used the concept of Maximum 
Acceptable Waiting Time (MAWT) developed in New Zealand to classify patients 
according to different levels of urgency. The clinical criteria used to determine 
urgency consider specific elements such as pain, functional activity, mobility and 
deformity. On that scale, patients with a score of 0–30 are classified as urgent 1 
and should receive treatment within 20 weeks; those with a score of 31–75 are 
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classified as urgent 2 and should receive treatment within 12 weeks; and those 
with a score of 76–100 are classified as urgent 3 and should receive treatment 
within 4 weeks (Masri, et al., 2005). See Table 1. 
Table 1 MAWT developed in New Zealand 
 Priority Score MAWT 
Urgent 1 0–30 20 weeks 
Urgent 2 31–75 12 weeks 
Urgent 3 76–100 4 weeks 
Source: Masri et al., 2005 
 
In 1994 a federal mandate created the Western Canada Waiting List 
(WCWL) Project to improve fairness and access to the health system (Arnett, 
2003) and to develop a valid and reliable measure for patients on wait lists 
(Noseworthy, 2003). The WCWL Project made changes to the previous MAWT 
developed in New Zealand, adapting it to Canadians’ needs as follows:  urgency I, 
the least urgent cases, should be treated within three to six months; urgency II, the 
less urgent cases, should be treated within one to three months; and urgency III, 
the most urgent, should receive treatment within less than one month (Western 
Canada Waiting List Project, 2005). See Table 2. 
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Table 2 Priorities MAWT Canada (Western Canada Waiting List Project, 
2005) 
Priorities MAWT  
Urgency III : Most urgent cases < 1 month 
Urgency II : Less urgent cases 1–3 months 
Urgency I : Least urgent cases 3–6 months 
Source: Rumble & Kreder, 2005 
 
 
Finally, Appleby (2003) established three categories of WTMS based on their 
level of success in achieving these wait time goals: 1) successful, 2) variable 
performance and 3) unsuccessful.  
Table 3 WTMS categories based on level of success 
Categories  
Successful Low proportions of patients waiting over six 
months 
Variable performance Some success in reducing the proportion of 
people waiting over six months but not 
sustained 
Unsuccessful High proportions of patients waiting over 
six months. 
Source: Appleby, 2005 
 
2.1.3 Do planning strategies consider potential unintended 
consequences? 
 
For any strategy, the planning process will draw from different disciplines 
in areas related to program management and implementation.  
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For example, project management uses strategic, tactical and operational 
planning to achieve a project’s objectives (Goulet, Albert, & Touré, 1996). It also 
follows specific steps using a variety of governance, management, and 
administrative activities (Beaudouin, 1984). In project management, control and 
evaluation activities are used as instruments for adjusting the process or 
intervention to improve outcomes. However, project management does not include 
analysis of a project’s potential effects. In healthcare, planning management deals 
with forces such as healthcare providers, patients’ interest groups, and a variety of 
other organizations and agencies involved in the healthcare system (Green, 1992). 
“Priority setting of health interventions is one of the most challenging and difficult 
issues faced by health policy decision makers around the world” (Youngkong, 
Kapiriri, & Baltussen, 2009, p. 930). The healthcare planning management process 
includes implementation, control and evaluation activities (Goulet et al., 1996). 
Control and evaluation activities are used to analyze the effects of a program or 
project. The control process compares an intervention’s outcomes with its 
objectives and with established standards, both of which are used to make changes 
to improve outcomes (Bergeron, 1986). Evaluation has been studied from different 
perspectives. However, there is not a single agreed-upon definition, since there are 
different models of evaluation (Patton, 1982). Moreover, the concept has evolved 
based on historical and philosophical changes (Guba & Lincoln, 1989).  
Evaluation refers to a making a value judgment of an intervention. 
Evaluations can be categorized according to the area of activity being considered: 
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standards, strategy, logic, production, effects, economic, implementation 
(Brousselle, Champagne, Contandriopoulos, & Hartz, 2009). Evaluation of effects 
is probably the type of evaluation most closely linked to the analysis of potential 
consequences of any intervention. It considers both desirable and undesirable 
anticipated effects (Brousselle et al., 2009) 
Finally, project management risk analysis forecasts potential risks and 
recommends initiatives to mitigate their consequences. It has been used in 
healthcare “to reduce patients’ risks in hospitals and to reduce injuries to patients” 
(Duran, 1980). Furthermore, “project risk management is about being ready for the 
unwanted event, especially when the most obvious happens. It predicts neither 
what will happen nor when” (Wideman, 1992). According to Wideman, the final 
goal of project management risk analysis is to forecast the various sources of risk 
that could severely affect the project and to reduce their potential consequences. 
The four stages of risk management are:  identification, assessment and 
quantification, response development, and documentation and control. Potential 
risks to a project are ranked in terms of high or low impact and high or low 
probability. In addition to developing specific strategies to avoid those potential 
risks, managers and decision-makers will put in place the necessary feedback and 
evaluation mechanisms (Wideman, 1992).  
While valuable information can be drawn from literature on planning 
processes about the potential side effects of using strategies, there is no strong 
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evidence or specific information to indicate that there has been any deep analysis 
of the potential effects of WTMS on healthcare organizations. 
 
2.2 Unintended consequences - a literature review 
2.2.1 History of unintended consequences 
Unintended consequences (UCs) have been the subject of numerous studies 
in various fields including sociology, economics, politics, and technology. This 
topic has been studied by philosophers and thinkers from Popper and Sartre to 
Marx and Hegel. However, it originated in the social sciences, where Robert 
Merton developed the concept of UCs in the area of social action. In his paper 
“The unanticipated consequences of purposive social action” (Merton, 1936), he 
pointed out that purposive action does not imply rationality of human action and 
that, in fact, rationality and irrationality are not directly related to the success or 
failure of any action. Merton discussed two significant elements to be considered 
with respect to UCs. One was the problem of “causal imputation”, in which 
consequences could be attributed to specific factors related to a given event. The 
other was the purpose of an action, which relates to the action’s rationality or 
irrationality. He suggested that consequences should be analyzed in four different 
groups: consequences to the actor, consequences to other persons mediated 
through the social structure, consequences to the culture, and consequences to the 
civilization (Merton, 1936). He pointed out that UCs are not necessarily 
undesirable consequences. In fact, the unexpected could be either positive or 
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negative. Merton also described five potential factors that could be related to UCs: 
ignorance, in which a lack of knowledge usually causes negative consequences; 
error, in which mistakes could cause unexpected consequences; immediate 
interest, in which an actor, in an effort to avoid negative immediate consequences, 
does not consider further effects of the same action; basic values, in which the 
actor does not consider any consequences because his values do not allow him to 
think about them; and finally prediction, in which social prediction and planning 
could cause unexpected consequences at the social and human levels (Merton, 
1936). 
Sociologist Richard Vernon summarized multiple concepts and their 
originating philosophers, all of whom have contributed to the concept of UCs 
(Vernon, 1979). He cites Sartre, who stated that “the consequences of our actions 
always end up by escaping us” (Sartre, 1985). He points out that Popper, who did 
“as much as anyone in the last few decades to familiarise us with the notion, places 
unintended consequences in the front line of defence of ‘methodological 
individualism’” (Vernon, 1979, p. 57). Vernon asserts that Hegel was more 
connected to the retrospective concept of UCs, whereas Marx and Engels were 
more focused on the prospective vision of UCs. According to Vernon, Hayek, 
Ferguson, Smith and Hume all agree with the link between UCs and the social 
sciences. Moreover, he states that Hayek sees UCs “as the foundation of an order 
more free and efficient than any other” (Hayek, 1979, p. 58). Finally, according to 
Vernon, Hayek is connected with the concept of the veil of ignorance, which 
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determines principles of social justice. In the end, Vernon summarized four 
different possible origins of UCs: The cumulative outcome of similar actions 
performed simultaneously or consequently by a number of actors, the 
simultaneous or consecutive performance of dissimilar actions by individuals or 
groups, contextual change, and the difference between intended and unanticipated 
consequences (Vernon, 1979). Sociologist Raymond Boudon contributed the 
concept of perverse effects and social events to the understanding of UCs. He cites 
several examples of this concept, for example, the perverse effects of 
democratization in schools and its relation with social inequality. According to 
Forquin, in his analysis of Boudon’s work, the social consequences of acts are 
related to unintentional or unpredictable purposes from a combination of 
individual and intentional acts (Forquin, 1979). Sociologist Portes explains that 
purposive social action is related to the unexpected, an idea which refers to 
Merton’s theory of unintended consequences. In fact, he describes social 
predictable steps based on the logic of purposive social action (Portes, 2000). 
Finally, the law of unintended consequences, which originated in the field of 
economics, states that “actions of people always have effects that are unanticipated 
or unintended” (Norton, 2008). 
2.2.2 Definition of unintended consequences and related concepts 
Since there are different perspectives on UCs, this section presents various 
definitions of the concept; however, this thesis has been developed based on the 
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definition that seems most appropriate, which is that of Baert (1991), as presented 
below.  
Rogers defines consequences as “changes that occur to an individual or to a 
social system as a result of an innovation” (Rogers, 2003). According to Rogers, 
consequences can be described or classified, but not predicted or forecasted. He 
highlights three main elements to consider regarding the consequences of 
innovations. The first is the assumption that the consequences of innovations are 
always desirable and positive; because of this, consequences have been 
understudied. Second, research methods are not very appropriate for investigating 
the consequences of innovation. Finally, consequences are difficult to measure 
(Rogers, 2003).  
There are as many perspectives on UCs as there are definitions. However, 
we must distinguish between the concepts of unintended and unanticipated, which 
are not synonymous (Ash, Sittig, Poon, et al., 2007). The concept ‘unintended’ 
implies a lack of purposeful action or causation, while ‘unanticipated’ means an 
inability to forecast what eventually occurred. Either kind of consequence can be 
adverse or beneficial (Ash, Sittig, Poon, et al., 2007). “Intended consequences are 
the objectives of the action, the targets toward which it is oriented, and the motives 
that stimulate it. Unanticipated consequences, on the other hand, are outcomes of 
the action that the actor does not expect in advance and therefore does not intend” 
(McKinley & Scherer, 2000, p. 3). 
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Sociologist Patrick Baert proposes a definition, affirming that “unintended 
consequence refers to a particular effect of purposive action which is different 
from what was wanted at the moment of carrying out the act, and the want of 
which was a reason for carrying it out” (Baert, 1991, p. 201). Baert highlights four 
points that emerge from this definition of UC. The first is the importance of 
intentionality, in that effects can be produced by intention or not. Second, one 
action is associated with many consequences, most of which are effects of other 
consequences. Third, any action’s consequences can be determined 
retrospectively. And fourth, the actor has only one intention in the act (Baert, 
1991). For the purposes of this project, we will work with Baert’s definition, as it 
seems clear and relevant. 
2.2.3 Classification of unintended consequences 
On the basis of the above, in this section we review different types or 
classifications of UCs. As mentioned, Merton differentiated between consequences 
related to the actor, to other persons mediated through the social structure, to the 
culture and to the civilization (Merton, 1936). Baert considers dimensions and 
modes of UC. Dimension A considers what the effect refers to, both individually 
and socially. Dimension B refers to the potential desirability of some effects. 
Dimension C refers to the intentionality of the event. Dimension D refers to 
awareness of the effect or the lack of forecasting of potential effects. Finally, 
dimension E takes into account potential effects that occur either at the same time 
as the initial event or in a completely different period of time (Baert, 1991).  
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With reference to quality improvement, UCs could be classified according 
to direct and indirect effects on resource utilization, provider behaviours, and 
patients. Resource utilization is related to the unexpected consequences of 
resource use at different levels in health programs. For example, clinical practice 
guidelines could prevent over-use of resources (O'Brien, Jacobs, & Pierce, 2000), 
but they could also cause unexpected increases in disparities in care, while not 
necessarily reducing costs (Phelan, Link, & Diez-Roux, 2004). Provider behaviour 
refers to four subtypes of UCs: 1) lack of valid process measures, which could 
cause providers to have different perceptions of a measure or program (Casalino, 
1999); 2) limitations on innovation because of the implementation of clinical 
practice guidelines (Linton & Peachet, 1990); 3) decrease in quality and quantity 
of time in patients’ consultations with physicians, since doctors have only a ‘fixed’ 
amount of time to accomplish certain tasks (Mechanic, McAlpine, & Rosenthal, 
2001; St Peter, Reed, Kemper, & Blumenhal, 1999); and 4) pay-for-performance, 
which could influence providers’ selection of cases in a way that would adversely 
affect performance improvement and quality (McDonald & Roland, 2009). 
Finally, patients are not aware that their individual preferences in clinical care may 
be directly associated with quality improvement (Bardach & Cabana, 2009; C., 
Davidowitz, Heineken, & Covinsky, 2004) . 
According to Rogers, there are three different attributes of consequences: 
desirable versus undesirable; direct versus indirect, and anticipated versus 
unanticipated (Rogers, 2003). Some consequences are the product of individual 
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desires and are, in general, positive or desirable, whereas undesirable 
consequences are effects individuals do not really want and, as a result, are usually 
negative effects. Direct consequences are effects caused by a specific event, 
whereas indirect consequences are effects caused by a number of different acts or 
a chain of events. Finally, anticipated consequences are those we are able to 
predict, whereas unanticipated consequences are not expected (Ash, 2007; 
Bloomrosen et al., 2011; Rogers, 2003). 
Figure 1 depicts potential relationships across and among types of 
consequences. This figure draws upon earlier work, particularly that of Rogers, 
Ash and Campbell (Ash, 2007; Campbell, Sittig, Ash, Guappone, & Dykstra, 
2006; Rogers, 2003). If a consequence is anticipated and desirable, it will be the 
intended or positive consequence or the goal of any act. If a consequence is 
anticipated but undesirable, it will be considered a trade-off. If a consequence is 
unanticipated and desirable, it will be recognized as serendipity. Finally, if a 
consequence is unanticipated and undesirable it will be the classic negative 
consequence. Based on this figure, there are three different types of unintended 
consequences and one intended consequence (Ash, 2004, 2007; Ash, Sittig, 
Campbell, Guappone, & Dykstra, 2007; Bloomrosen et al., 2011) 
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Figure 1 Classification of unintended consequences 
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Source: Bloomrosen et al., 2011. 
 
For the purposes of this project, these relationships across and among types 
of consequences will serve as our framework for analyzing strategies implemented 
in healthcare institutions. 
2.2.4 The UCs of strategies implemented in health services: an 
empirical review of the literature 
Many papers have been published on unintended consequences of 
interventions implemented in health services. The majority of articles we found 
examine the potential effects of measuring quality of care, of using technology (on 
health services and providers), and of health policies and health reforms.  
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Policymakers and clinicians have expressed concerns that efforts to 
improve quality of care in some areas have, as a consequence, decreased it in other 
areas. Quality of care measurements are taken not only to improve care, but also to 
look for possible UCs, analyze different methods of avoiding them, and reduce 
their adverse effects (Casalino, 1999). Quality of care measurements have been 
used as indicators of improved care. Currently, policy-makers are worried about 
potential negative consequences of these measurements. For example, using 
performance measurements in primary care could cause inappropriate clinical care 
due to providers’ lack of attention to patients’ needs (Powell et al., 2011). 
Effective public reporting of healthcare quality represents openness and 
accountability, but could also lead to a reduction of overall healthcare quality 
(Werner & Asch, 2005). Since the United Kingdom’s primary care pay-for-
performance scheme was implemented, identifying UCs of quality indicators has 
become a major goal in the planning process, in order to either remove or adjust 
problems indicators (Lester, Hannon, & Campbell, 2011). Regarding the 
consequences on health services and providers of using technology, Ash has been 
studying the effects on healthcare facilities of the implementation of technology in 
specific tasks. He describes the valuable lessons learned from technology pioneers, 
but at the same time, points out the UCs of implementing the Computerized 
Provider Order Entry (CPOE) that could be avoidable in the future. There are also 
unpredictable and unexpected consequences related to CPOE that need to be 
identified, described and categorized (Campbell et al., 2006). Identifying some 
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unintended consequences may help “HIT [Healthcare Information Technology] 
designers and healthcare professionals learn to deploy HIT more effectively” 
(Harrison, Koppel, & Bar-Lev, 2007, p. 547). Sveiby et al. describe a lack of 
attention to the unintended consequences of innovation in health matters (Sveiby, 
Gripenberg, Segercrantz, Eriksson, & Aminoff, 2009). The last decade has 
provided an opportunity to better understand the unanticipated health impacts of 
social and economic policies in order to decrease discrimination and to improve 
conditions in disadvantaged populations (Berkman, 2011). The importance of 
minimizing UCs when implementing new health policies and programs is well 
known. A better understanding of the dynamic forces influencing the healthcare 
system could decrease the potential risks of UCs resulting from policy-makers, 
although those consequences seem to be an “inherent part of the political and 
policy process” (Young & Institute of Medicine, 2001, p. 9). Economic incentives 
such as pay-for-performance have been associated with some UCs that could have 
been predicted. As a consequence, health policies should include measures to 
avoid economic incentives that increase adverse selection (McDonald & Roland, 
2009). Another point is that charging user fees for healthcare is linked to inequity 
because it strengthens the barriers experiences by disadvantaged population with 
financial limitations (Hofmann, 2009; Karve, Ou, Lytle, & Peterson, 2008; 
Lagarde & Palmer, 2011). There is evidence that removing user fees increases the 
use not only of curative healthcare services, but also of preventive services, which 
have positive impacts in the long run (Lagarde & Palmer, 2011).  
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Many publications on the consequences of health reforms have appeared in 
United States. Some authors have raised concerns about the potential effects of the 
new health legislation. As the Obama administration takes aim at reducing costs 
and investments in technology improvements within the healthcare system, some 
authors see a risk of UCs such as slowed medical progress in new technologies and 
decreased quality of care (Thrall, 2011). They argue that policy-makers and 
legislators need to involve health professionals more in the process to avoid 
potential UCs of legislation on the healthcare system (Thrall, 2011). It is important 
to note that health reforms are linked with fiscal constraints, and that looking for 
efficiencies may reduce access and create inequities in care (Lynam et al., 2003). 
Serious concerns have been voiced about the reimbursement of care and its 
possible consequences in terms of accessibility and quality of care (Klodas, 2010). 
Moreover, healthcare decisions based only on budget considerations may increase 
the number of uninsured people and affect public programs such as the treatment 
of end-stage renal disease (Nissenson, 1996). Other authors have a more positive 
view of health reform in the U.S. For example, Hammer, Phillips and Schmidt 
have suggested that health reform will change some aspects in the right direction, 
improving access to high quality care, although providers will face some necessary 
changes in their organizations (Hammer, Phillips, & Schmidt, 2010).  
While New Zealand has successfully implemented health reform, it has 
struggled with UCs such as funding problems, an increase in the power of medical 
organizations, and new challenges to providing primary care (Gauld, 2008).  
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The UCs of strategies implemented in the healthcare system have been 
attracting increasing attention from researchers, clinicians and policy-makers. 
Papers have focused on both understanding classic negative UCs and 
implementing strategies to avoid them.  
2.2.5 Consequences of wait times for hip and knee replacement in 
Canada 
Some authors acknowledge that waiting for procedures that will improve 
any unhealthy condition could cause consequences such as extended suffering and 
pain, increased patient dissatisfaction and strained patient–doctor relationships 
(Bruni et al., 2010). Others posit that managing wait time is practically impossible 
and would also have consequences. Canada’s wait list strategy is based on clinical 
and non-clinical factors that can differ from one institution to another and from 
one province to another. As a consequence, “this situation inevitably leads to 
concerns regarding fairness and the risks faced by patients who may not be 
receiving timely and necessary care based on an assessment of relative urgency 
and the likelihood  of benefit” (Noseworthy, 2003, p. 24). The literature also 
points out that waiting for surgery causes consequences such as poorer outcomes 
related to the fact that patients are getting older and living longer with their 
disease. 
There is research indicating that there is no negative impact on clinical 
outcomes if the wait time is between three and six months. However, waiting more 
than six months can have significantly negative consequences for patient 
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outcomes, in addition to causing prolonged suffering and discomfort  (Nilsdotter, 
2002). 
Another consequence of waiting for surgery is the loss of productivity in 
individuals unable to work; their contribution to the labour market is significantly 
lowered during the wait. Finally, delaying any procedure will increase both costs 
to the healthcare system (Masri et al., 2005) and side effects on the network of 
exchanges between participants in the health sector (Fry & Polonsky, 2004). 
While authors and researchers are focused essentially on how to improve 
wait times and manage long wait lists, there are currently not enough articles 
detailing the potential UCs of implementing WTMS.   
2.3 Levels of healthcare organizations 
With regarding to the structure of healthcare organizations, there are a 
number of models from different perspectives. For example, Contandriopoulos’ 
model of the structure of any healthcare system includes physical structure 
(economic, human, technique and physical resources), symbolic structure (values 
and ideologies) and organizational structure (federal and provincial legislation and 
rules) (Contandriopoulos, 2008). 
According to Mintzberg, the elements of structure are the operating core 
(employees who produce the basic product and services), the strategic apex 
(managers of the organization and staff), the middle line (managers between the 
strategic apex and the operating core), the technostructure (technicians and 
analysts) and the support staff (legal counsel, public relations) (Mintzberg, 1990). 
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Légaré describes three levels of shared decision-making (SDM) within the 
Canadian healthcare system based on levels of patient involvement: the healthcare 
system (macro level), institutions (meso level), and the clinical/medical encounter 
(micro-level) (Légaré, 2007). The macro level refers to the participation of people 
at different levels of government (federal, provincial, and territorial). The meso 
level considers different characteristics of health institutions and hospitals, and the 
micro level analyzes physicians’ and patients’ responsibility and involvement in 
the health of individuals.  
For the purposes of this thesis, Légaré’s perspective seems more 
understandable in terms of its applicability to the analysis of potential UCs of 
WTMS at three distinct levels: systemic, organizational and individual.  
 
Figure 2 Levels of healthcare organizations 
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HKR pathway at the organizational level 
This framework considers three levels of the HKR pathway along which 
consequences of WTMS may occur: prehospital, hospital, and post-hospital levels 
(see Figure 4 below). 
The prehospital level includes activities occurring in the process of GPs’ 
referral of patients for surgery assessment. The hospital level includes tasks and 
procedures that encompass the clinical assessment centre (CAC), the operating 
room (OR), post-operative care (POP) and discharge. The post-hospital level 
includes activities to improve patients’ rehabilitation (RHB) after surgery, either at 
the rehabilitation centre or at home.  
Figure 3 HKR pathway 
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WTMS, UCs and levels of healthcare organizations. In considering potential UCs 
linked to WTMS, there are three different levels where consequences may be 
found in healthcare organizations:  systemic (macro), organizational (meso), and 
individual (micro).   
At the macro/systemic level of the Canadian health system, significant 
potential consequences of using health policies of WTMS can be found at the 
federal, provincial and local levels. Moreover, it would be valuable to analyze 
some potential consequences of allocating resources to improve wait times in 
HKR rather than investing those resources in other wait lists such as for cancer, 
spine, pediatric surgery, neurosurgery, and general surgery. 
At the organizational (meso) level, there are a variety of potential UCs 
related to the HKR pathway followed in healthcare facilities. Each of the levels 
described above (federal, provincial, local) may cause UCs in the referral, 
assessment centre, operating room, in-patient, delivery and rehabilitation 
processes. 
Finally, at the individual (micro) level, there are the potential UCs of 
different actors who participate in the organization of HKR, including managers, 
health professionals, patients and their families. Managers are professionals who 
have the responsibility for implementing and developing federal and provincial 
policies within healthcare institutions. They play a key mediating role between 
organizations and health professionals looking to achieve goals at all levels of 
healthcare facilities. 
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Health professionals are deeply involved in implementing any health 
policy, since they are responsible for efficiently conducting procedures to improve 
patients’ health. Not only do they treat patients and their families, but they also 
receive personal and professional satisfaction in terms of economic incentives, 
quality of life, and employment stability. Examples of health professionals include 
nurses, surgeons, general practitioners (GPs), anaesthesiologists and advanced 
practice physiotherapists (APPs).  
Finally, patients and families are essential components of the healthcare 
system; they are directly affected by any health policy and WTMS, and they will 
suffer the consequences of any delay in treatment or enjoy the benefits of timely 
attention. 
Analyzing the UCs of implementing WTMS in HKR, based on Rogers’ 
concepts, which were further developed by Bloomrosen (see Figure 1), will help to 
advance our understanding of desirable and undesirable, anticipated and 
unanticipated, and direct and indirect consequences in terms of trade-offs, negative 
consequences and serendipities.  
This framework (Figure 4) will provide valuable information to shed light 
on the potential consequences of implementing strategies at different levels of 
healthcare institutions. Furthermore, understanding UCs has attracted considerable 
research interest and should be an important step for any healthcare organization to 
consider in any planning process, in order to prevent negative effects of 
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implementing WTMS and avoid unexpected situations that could affect patients, 
budgets, health policies and the healthcare system. 
Figure 4 Framework of unintended consequences 
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Figure 5 Integrated model of unintended consequences on healthcare 
organizations 
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Chapter 3 - Methodology 
This chapter describes the methodology used in this project. It is presented 
in eight parts: 1) research team; 2) research strategy; 3) research design; 4) 
identification of the case study; 5) data collection and materials; 6) data analysis; 
7) quality of the research design; and 8) ethical considerations. 
3.1 Research team 
The overall research project has been funded by the Canadian Institutes of 
Health Research (CIHR). The team is led by Dr.Tom Noseworthy from the 
University of Calgary and Dr. Marie-Pascale Pomey from the University of 
Montreal. It also includes Claudia Sanmartin, Senior Researcher in the Health 
Analysis Division at Statistics Canada, and Carolyn DeCoster, Director of Clinical 
Service Optimization and Data Integration at Alberta Health Services. As a 
masters’ student in health administration, I was invited by Dr. Marie-Pascale 
Pomey to participate in the project. I participated actively in the team by recruiting 
the various case study sites, going on-site to conduct interviews with participants, 
collecting and analyzing the data and, finally, writing the final report. I attended 
various team meetings and maintained a high level of communication and 
collaboration with all members of the research team. 
3.2 Research strategy 
This study is positioned within a constructivist paradigm, since it is 
focused on analyses of local and contextual features around WTMS and attempts 
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to interpret concepts and conversations form participants in the study (Lincoln & 
Guba, 2000). 
Qualitative studies have been used for many years, especially in social 
sciences, and are becoming increasingly important in healthcare research, 
contributing to the analysis of issues throughout the hospital and health systems 
(Pope & Mays, 2006). The qualitative approach to research “involves an 
interpretative, naturalistic approach to the world. This means that qualitative 
researchers study things in their natural settings, attempting to make sense of, or to 
interpret, phenomena in terms of the meanings people bring to them” (Denzin & 
Lincoln, 2000, p. 3). Thus, qualitative analysis seemed to be the ideal approach to 
achieve the goals of this project.  
Case studies are commonly used to develop qualitative studies with 
different approaches that are either analytical, involving specific and detailed 
study, or holistic, taking into account the importance and interdependence of the 
various parts (Stake, 2000). The case study approach has been used in different 
fields because it is a useful strategy to understand complex social phenomena that 
occur in real scenarios such as individual life cycles, and organizational and 
managerial processes (Yin, 2003). Furthermore, case studies have been used in 
healthcare in a variety of situations: investigation of health professionals by 
different healthcare organizations, evaluations by researchers, and re-engineering 
of hospitals by authorities. In case studies, two main approaches are used to 
develop research questions: studying policies based on theoretical frameworks 
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from previous research, and using empirical evaluative studies to determine the 
appropriateness of an intervention or its outcomes (Pope & Mays, 2006). 
Moreover, there are three further conditions for conducting any case study as 
empirical evidence: 1) the research question should be addressed in terms of what 
the problem is; 2) the investigator should have no control over the problem, to 
avoid manipulation and bias; and 3) the study should be focused on contemporary 
facts (Yin, 2003). As such, an exploratory case study seemed more appropriate for 
this project than other strategies, since in this project we are more interested in 
understanding the potential UCs of implementing WTMS in healthcare 
organizations based on a theoretical framework and empiric evaluation. In 
addition, a case study provides more valuable information to achieve the 
objectives and the address the research question of this thesis, because it meets 
three basic criteria: First, the research question should be on a relevant topic; 
WTMS is a headline topic in Canada. Second, the researcher should have no 
control in the study; there was no control by the researcher in this study, as we 
collected different perspectives that were then converged using triangulation. 
Third, the study should respect the rules for any research study with regard to the 
logic of design, data collection techniques and specific approach to data analysis 
(Yin, 2003); these rules were followed in this study. 
3.3 Research design 
Based on Yin components’ of any research design (2003), this research 
project is multiple case retrospective and descriptive study of four Canadian 
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healthcare organizations in which WTMS were implemented. There are three units 
of analysis: serendipities trade-offs and negative consequences at the contextual 
and organizational levels. The purpose of the study is to understand the potential 
UCs of using WTMS for HKR surgeries. Analysis of data based on the units of 
analysis will advance our understanding of potential UCs of WTMS, which in turn 
will be helpful in establishing theoretical concepts to improve planning processes 
to avoid UCs in the long term. Finally, the data will be compared against the UC 
framework and will be classified as serendipities, trade-offs and negative 
consequences (Yin, 2003).  
3.4 Identification of the cases 
3.4.1 Sampling 
We selected four cases in three Canadian provinces that would be 
classified as sustainable, moderately sustainable and unlikely to be sustainable 
based on the Federal benchmark. Bone and Joint Canada (BJC) and the Canadian 
Orthopaedic Association (COA) helped us to identify these cases. We were 
interested to analyze UC of using WTMS for HKR in each one of the potential 
scenarios of cases in terms of sustainability mentioned above and to understand 
differences between cases and potential factors that cause impact on their 
sustainability. 
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3.4.2 Classification of WTMS 
To select our case studies, we needed a classification system. Appleby’s 
system (2005) proposed three categories to describe levels of success in WTMS: 
1) successful – consistently low proportions of patients waiting over six months; 2) 
variable performance – some success in reducing the proportion of people waiting 
over six months, but not sustained; and 3) unsuccessful – consistently high 
proportions of patients waiting over six months (Appleby, 2005). Based on this 
system, we developed our own classification, presented in Table 4. 
Table 4 WTMS categories according to the WCWL project team 
 
This classification defined cases in terms of sustainable, moderately 
sustainable and unlikely sustainable based on wait time for HKR surgery for at 
least 6 to 12 months within a period of 18 months. 
Sustainable is defined if patients wait less than 26 weeks for HKR surgery. 
Moderately sustainable is defined if wait times for HKR surgery is 26 weeks. 
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Unlikely sustainable is defined if wait times for HKR surgeries is more than 26 
weeks.  
3.4.3 Recruitment of healthcare organizations 
The research team and BJC identified hospitals in different provinces that 
would fit the types of WTMS we were looking for. We then analyzed the data on 
wait times for HKR surgeries in those hospitals to determine whether they had 
initiatives that were sustainable, moderately sustainable or unlikely to be 
sustainable. Then we collected more detailed information on the initiatives from 
websites and articles. We contacted people from those healthcare organizations 
(HCOs) via email to inform them we were interested in studying their potential 
UCs of using WTMS. If they did not respond to our first email, we sent one to 
three reminders. Once contact was established, we obtained from them the name of 
the person with whom we should collaborate to apply for approval from hospital’s 
ethics board. This person served as the on-site project coordinator (PC) and was 
considered the principal investigator (PI) in that HCO site for ethics board 
purposes. Our research coordinator (RC) managed the ethics approval process, and 
once the approval was obtained, the RC asked the site PI to contact other potential 
key informants for the study. We then emailed each potential participant, 
describing the purposes of the study and asking them whether the classification we 
had assigned to their HCO was accurate or not. We then conducted on-site visits 
for a period of two days at each site. 
We selected four cases as follows: (for more details, see also page 45) 
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Case 1, a university hospital in northwest Ontario, is a reference centre for 
orthopaedic surgery. Its strategy started in 2007. We first classified it as 
moderately sustainable, but subsequently reclassified it as unlikely to be 
sustainable based on new data obtained from the institution.  
Case 2 is a university hospital in Ontario with no emergency room or intensive 
care unit. It does not do complex surgeries, and its strategy, classified as 
sustainable, started in 2007. 
Case 3, a university hospital in an eastern province, serves as a referral centre for 
the Maritime provinces. Its strategy, classified as unlikely to be sustainable, started 
in 2008. 
Case 4 is an orthopaedic surgery centre in Manitoba. Its strategy, classified as 
moderately sustainable, started in 2006. 
3.5 Data collection and materials 
The primary data source consisted of semi-structured, in-person interviews 
with key informants. Interviews dealt with questions on potential UCs all along the 
patient’s pathway, from the referral process to the rehabilitation process after 
surgery. Secondary data sources included pertinent information on the UCs of 
using WTMS in HKR in Canadian HCOs. 
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3.5.1 Semi-structured interviews 
This study used open-ended questions to define the area to be explored. 
With this approach, the interviewer is able to provide explanations as needed 
during the interview (Pope & Mays, 2006). Interviews with all participants were 
conducted using a semi-structured interview guide, such that they were 
conversations rather than structured inquiries (Yin, 2003). (See Appendix 1.)  
We conducted 31 semi-structured interviews, of 15 to 60 minutes’ 
duration, with key informants selected beforehand and others identified on-site. 
Two interviews were conducted by telephone due to participants’ schedules. The 
people interviewed were managers (3), assessment nurses at the CAC (3), CEOs 
(4), orthopaedic surgeons (4), physiotherapists (3), administrators (4), medical 
chiefs (4), nurse administrators (2), nurses in postoperative units (2) and an 
executive director at the provincial health system level (1). One researcher asked 
questions while the others took notes. After all interviews had been conducted at 
one case site, the researchers prepared a summary of the interviews. Interviews 
were audio recorded with the respondents’ authorization, and the recordings were 
subsequently transcribed verbatim. The transcripts were verified by the 
interviewer. Transcripts also were checked against the notes taken by the other 
researchers during the interviews. 
 The questionnaire asked different broad questions regarding patients’ 
pathways from GP assessment to the rehabilitation process, looking for pertinent 
and useful information linked to UCs at the systemic and the organizational levels. 
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3.5.2 Time frame 
The in-person interviews were conducted between June and November 
2011. The four researchers who visited the case study sites were Marie-Pascale 
Pomey, a master’s level student from the Faculty of Medicine who was 
specifically interested in factors that affect sustainability, a research coordinator 
(RC), and myself. 
3.6 Data analysis 
This study used qualitative data analysis based on four steps: preparation 
and description of information, data reduction, selection of modes of analysis, and 
cross-sectional analysis (Contandriopoulos, 2005). Documents and interviews 
were the principal source of information.  
In coding, we used data reduction, which took into account inclusiveness, 
adaptivity and a variety of abstraction levels (Contandriopoulos, 2005). Our 
framework oriented the themes to improve coding. In fact, the coding process 
followed a sequence of events. First, verbatim transcriptions were classified based 
on the UC questionnaire. Second, the results of the first step were classified 
according to whether the information was related to the systemic or organizational 
levels. Third, the verbatim quotes included in second step were classified, based 
on the framework, as serendipities, trade-offs and negative consequences. Quotes 
were classified strictly in the order in which they appeared in the interviews, and 
participants’ anonymity and confidentiality were maintained. The quotes were 
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reviewed several times to ensure our understanding of the information and to 
obtain the most relevant data possible. Each study site and participant was 
assigned a specific code to facilitate consistency of referencing.  
Even though three strategies have been described as modes of analysis—
relying on theoretical propositions, thinking about rival explanations, and 
developing case descriptions (Yin, 2003)—this thesis follows theoretical 
propositions made by Merton, Rogers and Bloomrosen for better understanding 
unintended consequences. Finally, cross-sectional analysis was used to analyze 
data since, it is the most appropriate technique for multiple case studies. 
3.7 Levels of analysis 
Based on the specific framework used in this study, potential UCs were 
analyzed in terms of serendipities, trade-offs, and negative consequences at the 
systemic and organizational levels. Serendipities were defined as desirable and 
unanticipated consequences, trade-offs as undesirable and anticipated 
consequences, and negative consequences as unanticipated and undesirable 
consequences (Ash, 2007; Bloomrosen et al., 2011; Rogers, 2003).  
Each case was analyzed at both the systemic and organizational levels, 
with both levels including sublevels of serendipities, trade-offs and negative 
consequences.  
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3.8 Quality of research design 
Four dimensions should be used to determine the quality of any empirical 
research: construct validity, internal validity, external validity and reliability (Yin, 
2003). It is important to point out that we applied these dimensions throughout the 
development of the project, not just at the beginning of the research, because we 
consider research design to be a continuous process. 
3.8.1 Construct validity 
Construct validity refers to developing the correct measures for the 
concepts being studied. Yin (2003) recommends two useful tactics: using multiple 
sources of evidence, and having the draft case study reviewed by key informants 
during the preparation of the case study report (Yin, 2003). 
3.8.2.1 Multiple sources of evidence 
Of the six potential sources of evidence identified by Yin (2003), in this 
project we used documentation and interviews. Pertinent documentation on 
WTMS helped to corroborate information and to verify not only correct spelling of 
names and the organization, but also to confirm valuable data. Semi-structured 
interviews were conducted as fluid conversations guided by a questionnaire; every 
effort was made to avoid interviewer influence on responses. 
In this project we used triangulation, defined as “a process of using 
multiple perceptions to clarify meaning, verifying the repeatability of an 
observation or interpretation. It clarifies meaning by identifying different ways the 
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phenomenon is being seen” (Stake, 2000). The use of different sources (data 
triangulation) and information among researchers of the study (investigator 
triangulation) increased the validity of the project. Moreover, the information 
obtained from key informants was triangulated with internal documents from the 
four HCOs to validate the findings. Each on-site project coordinator reviewed the 
interpretation of the data to ensure accuracy. 
The review of the draft case study: a validating procedure. 
A draft report of results was prepared for each case and was shared with 
key informants of that case, who then reviewed it to validate the information and 
improve the quality of the study.  
3.8.2 Internal validity    
Internal validity considers that the conclusions of the study are linked to 
the changes caused by the implementation of the specific initiative and are not 
explained by other factors or forces (Contandriopoulos, 2005). We validated the 
information and the analysis done of each case to improve internal validity. This 
thesis also used triangulation to ensure and to enhance internal validity. 
3.8.3 External validity      
External validity analyzes whether or not a study’s results are generalizable 
to other contexts (Yin, 2003). In fact, the study should demonstrate that results are 
not dependent on a specific context or specific situation. External validity is 
defined based on three principles: similarity, robustness, and explanation 
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(Contandriopoulos, 2005). Similarity means the capacity to generalize results to a 
different empirical setting. Robustness is defined as the potential of generalization 
of the study in diversified contexts. Therefore, it is important to analyse more 
cases studies. For this, it is important not to focus only the relations between the 
results and detailed or specific conditions linked to the case, but rather to stay 
focused as much as possible on the broader level. Explanation increases external 
validity if it helps to explain actors’ activities and factors in the case that could be 
found in different scenarios (Contandriopoulos, 2005). This qualitative analysis in 
the Canadian context covers three different provinces that increase the potential 
for generalizing results from the case study to the rest of the country in terms of 
principles of similarity, robustness and explanation. In addition, transcripts of the 
interviews were provided to the participants for their feedback and verification, 
and direct quotes from those interviews with key informants are used to support 
and reinforce this project’s credibility and verifiability. Theories or frameworks 
also support the external validity of results in case studies (Yin, 2003).  
3.8.4 Reliability 
This concept considers that if a different researcher or investigator follows 
the same procedures to repeat the research described in a study, that second 
investigator should arrive at the same conclusions. In other words, any errors and 
biases in the study must be minimized (Yin, 2003). 
Creating a case study database and maintaining a chain of evidence are 
helpful to avoid problems in reliability. This thesis used a strict database organized 
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into five different files: general quotes, quotes linked to the questionnaire, and 
quotes related to serendipities, trade-offs, and negative consequences for each case 
study. Furthermore, case study notes were written after visiting each case and form 
part of the database, helping to decrease bias and increase reliability.  
Establishing a chain of evidence allows external observers to evaluate the 
study from its beginning to its conclusions. The case study protocol was designed 
to maintain a chain of evidence. Co-researchers from the WCWL project reviewed 
and validated each step of the study. Moreover, the UC framework designed for 
this study was validated by a panel of external health management experts and the 
study was also evaluated in academic meetings, where external observers 
evaluated it. 
3.8.5 Reflexivity 
Reflexivity refers to the “sensitivity to the ways in which the researcher 
and research process have shaped the collected data” (Pope & Mays, 2006). The 
author of this thesis, a surgeon, acknowledges that his previous experiences and 
knowledge of different circumstances, both positive and negative, in operating 
rooms could influence the analysis of the cases result. However, triangulation, case 
study notes for each case, and external validation have been used to help preserve 
the neutrality of the results (Devers, 1999). 
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3.8.6 Multiple perspectives   
Based on the approach suggested by Pope and Mays (2006), and adopting a 
broad concept of UC, this study takes into account multiple perspectives on the 
potential UCs of using WTMS. Indeed, this thesis project analyzed the problem 
from a variety of points of view in order to enhance our understanding of UC and 
to increase the project’s validity. As such, we sought the views of managers, 
nurses, surgeons, physiotherapists and CEOs involved in the strategy.  
3.8.7 Relevance  
This thesis increases our understanding of WTMS through the analysis of 
UCs, which is a new perspective on WTMS. In doing so, it will add valuable 
information on the subject and hopefully stimulate interest in pursuing further 
research on the potential UCs of implementing strategies in healthcare 
organizations (Pope & Mays, 2006) 
3.9 Ethical considerations  
In social sciences, codes of ethics consider four elements: informed 
consent, deception, privacy and confidentiality, and accuracy (Christians, 2000). 
However, in healthcare qualitative research, anonymity, confidentiality and 
informed consent have major significance (Goodwin, 2006) and are therefore the 
ethical considerations we applied in this thesis. Anonymity: “Codes of ethics insist 
on safeguards to protect people’s identities and those of the research locations” 
(Christians, 2000, p. 139). In qualitative research in healthcare, protecting the 
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identity of participants is complicated, because there are so many elements and 
comments where quotations could suggest the participant’s identity (Goodwin, 
2006). Therefore, this study used numeric references for both the cases studied and 
the participants, to maintain anonymity. Confidentiality: In qualitative research, 
while people’s identities will be kept private to ensure anonymity, this does not 
mean that what people say in a qualitative study will be kept secret (Pope & Mays, 
2006). This thesis uses this definition of confidentiality, in order not only to ensure 
anonymity, but also to use valuable information from respondents. Participants 
were assured that the information they provided would remain confidential, and 
that their anonymity would be guaranteed during the process of collection, analysis 
and publication of the data. Informed consent: This refers to respecting individual 
autonomy and the right of participants in any study to be informed “about the 
nature and consequences of experiments in which they are involved”. In fact, 
subjects should participate voluntarily and receive open and complete information 
(Denzin & Lincoln, 2000). This thesis project followed strict protocols and rules to 
ensure participants received full information about the study, its nature, and its 
potential consequences. We also sought participants’ informed consent to record 
the interviews. 
3.9.1 Ethical certificate 
This thesis, called project 4b, works together with project 4a, which is 
looking for factors that impact the sustainability of WTMS for total joint 
replacement surgeries in Canadian provinces. These two projects are part of the 
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WCWL project looking at WTMS.  Project 4a received a certificate of approval on 
October 14, 2010, from the University of Montreal research ethics committee. 
Since project 4b is linked with project 4a, it received a certificate of renewal on 
November 8, 2011, from the University of Montreal research ethics committee 
(certificate no. CERFM#421(1)). Ethical approval was also obtained from each 
hospital that agreed to participate in the study. After ethical committee approval 
from both the University of Montreal and the ethical committees of each case, 
participants in the study read and signed the consent form prepared jointly by the 
University of Montreal research team and their hospital’s ethics committee. 
Transcripts of interviews have been stored in a computer with a private access 
code, in a locked office at the University of Montreal. This database, which forms 
part of a larger study that includes three other projects, some of which are 
expected to continue until 2012, will be securely conserved for a minimum of five 
years to a maximum of ten years from that time.    
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Chapter 4 - Results 
The results regarding potential unintended consequences are presented 
based on the framework in Figure 4. Thus, for each case we analyze the 
serendipities, trade-offs and negative consequences associated with using WTMS 
in HKR surgeries in Canada at the systemic and organizational levels. This 
approach allows the reader to follow a sequence of facts (Yin, 2003). As 
mentioned previously, serendipities are desirable and unanticipated consequences, 
trade-offs are anticipated and undesirable consequences, and negative 
consequences are undesirable and unanticipated. At the systemic level, we 
considered consequences at the federal or provincial level linked to health policies 
on wait times. At the organizational level, we included consequences along the 
WTMS pathway from the referral process (prehospital) through surgery (hospital) 
and rehabilitation (post-hospital).  
Description of cases 
Case 1 is a reference centre for orthopaedic surgery and its strategy started in 
2007. We originally classified it as moderately sustainable, however, we 
subsequently reclassified it as unlikely to be sustainable based on new data 
obtained from the institution. The strategy used was based on accountability 
agreement. They included APPs (Advanced Practice Physiotherapists) as part of 
the program. However, they have been losing their participation in the 
development of the program. 
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Case 2 is a university hospital with no emergency room or intensive care unit. It 
does not do complex surgeries, and its strategy, classified as sustainable, started in 
2007. Type of strategy was based on accountability agreements. They also 
included APPs (Advanced Practice Physiotherapists) as an essential part of the 
program. Number of cases: 2100 
Case 3 is a university hospital that serves as a reference centre. Its strategy, 
classified as unlikely to be sustainable, started in 2008. Their strategy was based 
on patient access registry and they received  funding extra linked to activities. 
Number of cases: 990 
Case 4 is an orthopaedic surgery centre and its strategy, classified as moderately 
sustainable, started in 2006. They used funding extra according to activities. This 
institution decided to create a new classification of WT based on efficiency. 
Category A: Patient is ready for surgery. Category B: Surgery is delay for medical 
reasons. Category C: Surgery is delay for personal reasons. Therefore, they were 
more focused in category A in order to achieve Federal benchmark. Number of 
cases: 3,000 in 3 hospitals. 
4.1 Case 1 
This university hospital in northern Ontario is a reference centre for 
orthopaedic surgery. Its strategy started in 2007. According to our study, its 
strategy was classified as a moderately sustainable. 
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4.1.1 Unintended consequences at the systemic level 
Serendipities 
According to our framework, there were no serendipities at the systemic 
level in this organization. 
Trade-offs 
According to respondents, the lack of provincial funding to sustain the 
program in the long term was a clear negative but anticipated fact. Policy-makers 
did not make any plan to guarantee budget for the organizations involved in this 
program. As a result, there was not enough money available for staff, data 
collection and analysis, and equipment: “There was no funding that was available 
for our staff to do the data entry (…).” (I.6 Q35). “Certainly for running 
consecutive rooms or two rooms you need to have additional nurses and so forth 
put into those rooms (…).” (I.4 Q15).  
Negative consequences 
Policy-makers did not have access to accurate data on WT, since surgeons 
managed their own lists. They were the ones who decided whether to do more 
procedures in a specific period of time or not to do surgeries. Therefore, wait times 
were increased in some periods of the year due to lack of control over wait lists: 
“You can actually see some increases in wait times in some periods where 
physicians have chosen to do more colonoscopies. So they’re picking and 
choosing, right? They have a lot of patients waiting for a colonoscopy and 
getting close to a threshold date, so they choose to do more colonoscopies 
that month and then they don’t do any.” (I.9 Q123) 
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Another repercussion of wait times being managed by surgeons is that 
provincial wait time policies are then based on inaccurate information, which 
affects not only provincial goals, but also organizational objectives regarding wait 
times and other programs. The manager of decision support stated: “We’re trying 
to plan services with incomplete knowledge of what our demand is; knowing what 
our capacity is, what we can do, and what we have funding for as well.” (I.9 Q56). 
In addition, the manager’s perception is that people are measuring the wrong 
elements, which negatively affects the planning process:  
“I see so many problems with the way they measure wait times. They’re 
measuring the wrong things. They’re measuring what they think they 
should be measuring, but it just doesn’t make any sense.” (I.1 Q149)  
There is a lack of regional standards on nosocomial infections, which has a 
negative impact: “We don’t have a regional standard by which every room is 
operating, nor do we have any way to accurately measure this, so it’s difficult for 
me to prove that we’ve got a problem.” (I.6 Q79).  
After human, economic, and organizational resources were taken away 
from some programs to improve WTMS in HKR, increases were seen in wait 
times for other procedures. In fact, wait times increased in areas such as 
arthroscopy, spine, foot, ENT and general surgery: “I would love to see 
neurosurgery on a wait times strategy. I don’t think for craniums we have a big 
backlog, but their backs (…).” (I.7 Q170). “I really think that tonsils and ears 
should be a huge wait time strategy because these kids really need to be done and 
with only having three ENT surgeons they’ve got (…).” (I.7 Q175). “We’re funded 
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a little bit for pediatrics, but that’s a black hole of work. But things like other 
orthopaedics too; arthroscopy has probably gone up.” (I.1 Q157). Apparently the 
problem was lack of money for all specialties and for measuring wait times. A 
manager commented on this: 
“Nobody measures it, nobody keeps us accountable to it, and there’s been 
no money to really deal with it, except if we do really well on our total joint 
numbers and we’re able to re-allocate some of those resources to those 
things.” (I.1 Q157) 
The manager also expressed concerns about the lack of evaluation of the 
program at the provincial level to analyze the efficiency of the WTMS: “They 
haven’t changed the priorities provincially in five years so; they’ve just kept 
working on the same priorities.” (I.1 Q156). 
After the province adopted the approach of applying economic incentives 
to increase volumes rather than decreasing wait times for patients, funding 
depended on results: “We want to be at that 700 procedures level a year, at least 
right now. We won’t even grow beyond that. The only way they’re going to give us 
money is if they see what they think are results.” (I.1 Q142). 
4.1.2 Unintended consequences at the organizational level 
Serendipities 
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Prehospital 
The referral process for HKR surgeries has been used as a role model to 
improve other programs’ processes. One interesting illustration of improvement 
based on using WTMS in HKR as a role model was seen in colonoscopy. The 
manager of decision support commented: 
“I know the referrals for patients for colonoscopy have now, since my 
program, also gone to a central intake model, so in this hospital we’re 
definitely looking at using the central intake model for more than just hip 
and knee and we’re now looking at it for general surgery as well.” (I.9 
Q86)  
In addition, one surgeon mentioned the importance of improving the 
accuracy of data on other wait times:  
"[What] they need to do is invest in understanding what their commitment 
is to spine and how many people are waiting for spinal surgery, and what 
their commitment is to joint replacement and how many people are waiting 
for that, and try to use this in a way that’s going to be effective.” (I.6 Q50) 
Hospital 
Before this program, the OR was considered a particularly stressful 
environment characterized by lack of trust and cooperation between surgeons and 
staff. In fact, surgeons and nurses didn’t have the same goals and sense of the job 
and as a consequence, stress was part of their relationship. In addition, we had not 
enough number of nurses working at the OR. Therefore, this elements cause 
unintended consequences at different levels on the OR for example on patient’s 
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safety. However, by the time of our study, this organization had been emphasizing 
the importance of team work in the OR and its impact on patient safety. Moreover, 
this institution has been working on the importance of team work regarding 
patients’ best interest. The concept of team work has been implemented not only in 
orthopaedics surgery, but also in other specialities. For example, the organization 
was working on improving the shared understanding of team goals around 
nosocomial infections. Increasingly, the health professionals agreed that 
nosocomial infections depended not only on the surgeon’s work, but also on that 
of the team:  
“So it was a long time for me to get people to understand that it is not a 
surgeon’s infection rate, it’s a hospital infection rate, it’s a process 
infection rate, a system one. And the hospital’s actually done remarkably 
well at evolving over such a short period of time from two very 
dysfunctional facilities to where we are.” (I.6 Q40) 
Even through the economic crisis, the WTMS program helped create more 
job opportunities for health professionals in the region. The chief of surgery stated: 
“Certainly for running consecutive rooms or two rooms you need to have 
additional nurses.” (I.4 Q15), and the manager added: “So we hired more nurses.” 
(I.1 Q137). 
One of the most interesting findings was that the model to improve wait 
times in HKR had been used as a role model not only in the referral process but 
also in processes of planning the hospital pathway of patients in other fields like 
cardiac surgery, paediatric surgery and general surgery. In fact, surgeons saw 
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reductions in their colonoscopy wait list: “Our colonoscopy waits have come down 
quite a bit.” (I-9 Q123). A nurse in the assessment centre explained clearly the 
importance of the WTMS program as a model in other programs to improve the 
pathway:  
“I think it has been a catalyst, I think they’ve gone into other clinical 
pathways now for cardiac patients and things. We don’t deal with that; but 
for the other surgeries we don’t have a pathway yet. I guess we probably 
could develop it later on.” (I.5 Q43) 
Leadership from surgeons was extremely important in persuading more 
specialists to get involved in this type of program. This institution had an 
orthopaedic surgeon who led the group to improve WT: “We had a really good 
orthopaedic surgeon on board with us as well, so he was very persuasive I guess.” 
(I.5 Q16). 
OR time is sometimes misunderstood as belonging to the surgeons. 
However, in this case, that understanding was gradually moving toward another 
view, in which OR time was viewed as a community resource. A general surgeon 
emphasized the importance of this change of mentality toward seeing OR time as 
community time: “Operative time is no longer a surgeon’s time; it’s a community 
time that the hospital doles out to surgeons for the production that the surgeon can 
use it for.” (I.6 Q63). He added: “This community cannot give you more OR time 
to get half measure from it. They’re not interested in you being prosperous, they’re 
interested in the community being prosperous.” (I.6 Q66). 
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One nurse administrator described how the organization was working on 
projects to improve nosocomial infections: 
“One of the residents is interested in doing an infection control thing on 
joints, so he’s making up a whole new form for the doctors to participate 
in, which is going to help us a lot, so that they’re all doing the same 
thing.” (I.7 Q204)  
 
Serendipities 
There were no serendipities at the post-hospital level. 
Trade-offs 
 There were no trade-offs at the prehospital level. 
Hospital 
As HKR volumes increased in the OR, relations among surgeons, 
anaesthesiologists and nurses were negatively affected. In addition, enormous 
resistance emerged due to an overwhelming amount of extra work. This resistance 
was associated with different views. Some people attributed it to the shortage of 
anaesthesiologists and their reputations as individualists who worked according to 
their own rules, whereas others linked it to the different levels of remuneration 
received.   
One surgeon stated, in relation to the anaesthesiologists: “They say, ‘I 
don’t want to work that late, I don’t want to do that other case’, and so then we’re 
struggling to try to find a way to get in that number of cases.” (I.6 Q16). There 
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was also resistance from anaesthesiologists because there were not enough 
specialists, and they took advantage of that to do their job in their own way:  
“The anaesthetists are a different breed; they have been a point [of 
contention] for a long time in every operating room in Canada, not enough 
anaesthetists, right? So no matter what kind of practice they choose to run, 
no matter how slow they are, no matter how unwilling to work late they 
are, we don’t have somebody to replace them, so they can basically act any 
way they want to.” (I.6 Q1) 
Anaesthesiologists expressed some concerns and pointed to the stress of 
running double rooms because they had to work more. The manager shared some 
comments from anaesthesiologists related to double rooms:  
“Anaesthesia, when they were short, they faced a lot of pressure, and a lot 
of them didn’t like the double-room days, that caused problems. It caused 
problems on the units, the double-room days, because you’ve got eight 
joints coming. They don’t want to work extra, so, you know, that’s stressful 
on your staff.” (I.1 Q165)  
On the other hand, nurses and surgeons sometimes experienced tensions 
related to economic issues. In fact, nurses were dissatisfied, due to lack of 
remuneration and work overload. One surgeon explained that nurses might have 
negative perceptions of the program because surgeons were getting more money 
with this program and nurses had to deal with work overload with no added 
financial compensation:   
“And so it’s been a very hard road to navigate, because the more you 
work, the more you earn, and when you want to make things more efficient 
it’s difficult for many people who are earning a small fraction of what 
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you’re earning to look and to say, ‘Well, it’s not got anything to do with 
money’.” (I.6 Q42)  
Therefore, nurses seemed to be still in the mindset of working for the 
surgeons rather than for the community:  
“They are still focused on ‘they’re working for the surgeon’, and they need 
very much to be educated that the surgeon is just a simple catalyst in this 
equation, that they’re not to look at that, they’re to look at them working 
for this person [the patient].” (I.6 Q67) 
Moreover, some staff have the idea that the surgeon is making more money 
with this program. In fact, one surgeon expressed his perception of this issue:  
“(…) everyone around looks and says, ‘Well, the surgeon is making more 
money because he’s doing more work’ and yes, that’s true, but the focus 
shouldn’t be on that, it should be ‘We have a community waiting list’.” (I.6 
Q16)  
Furthermore, the stress among surgeons was related not only to economic 
issues, but also to egos associated with ‘orthopaedic preferences and rules’. A 
nurse manager shared her experience of this tension among surgeons: “I think a lot 
of surgeons – and I’m sure it’s this way across the board – think that ortho rules, 
ortho is always the loudest, orthos always get what they want; and I’m sure it’s 
that way across the country.” (I.7 Q154) 
Overwhelming staff with work does not necessarily produce efficiency. 
One surgeon considered that efficiency would be better achieved by improving 
productivity in daily OR work: 
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“I think (...) eight joint days are probably not a smart way of managing it. 
It would be much more effective to increase the productivity of a normal 
OR day by 25%, and probably wouldn’t even have to add that much more 
time in it.” (I.6 Q71) 
As mentioned, the wait lists were managed by surgeons themselves. This 
caused problems not only at the systemic level, but also at the organizational level, 
where hospital managers were planning organizational strategies with inaccurate 
data. The manager of this organization expressed his frustration: “We can manage 
volumes, but we can’t necessarily manage physician lists. Physicians are 
independent practitioners (…) they’re not employees of the hospital.” (I.1 Q149). 
This institution was a referral hospital for orthopaedic surgeries and other 
specialties for northern Ontario. As such, it received a significant number of 
patients. However, there were not enough beds available to accommodate HKR 
patients as well as other surgical patients. In fact, there was no plan for improving 
bed distribution, and floor nurses had to deal with difficult bed situations on daily 
basis. One nurse who worked on the surgical floor commented: 
“In terms of the amount of beds that are available, it varies from day to 
day, and you kind of have to go day-to-day, you know. Sometimes you’re in 
great luck, and you just kind of have to assess what you can do on a day-
to-day basis.” (I.2 Q15)  
As a result, this organization was struggling to improve efficiency in the 
OR due to lack of hospital beds. A nurse who managed beds on the floor stated: 
“I’d have to say that over the years (…) it’s pretty much remained the same (…) it 
hasn’t changed a lot.” (I-2 Q44). One surgeon pointed out that sometimes they did 
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surgeries and patients would have to wait in the recovery room for a long time 
before they got a bed: 
“So I would go in and do one joint in one room, and go with the same 
anaesthetist but a different scrub team to the next room, do another joint, 
and bounce back and forth; and that worked out reasonably well. There’s 
really not a good way to manage beds, because all of a sudden you come in 
and you have eight joints plus whatever else was going on, so we’ve been 
struggling (...).” (I.6 Q10) 
This organization’s culture had a negative impact on its ability to achieve 
its goals in terms of efficiency and team work. People did not feel enough 
confidence in each other and did not cooperate to improve efficiency because of 
their different personal views on the program. “Why don’t you co-operate with 
each other and pass over cases?” (I.6 Q63). From the surgeons’ perspective, 
working as a team would increase efficiency and they could finish work early:  
“We’d need a focused team who gets to go home when they’re finished 
their work (...) You know, work until you’re done. If we get it done at 2:00, 
go home; if we get it done at 4:00, well, you’re staying half an hour; if it’s 
done at 3:30, well, you did your job.” (I.6 Q71)  
This lack of confidence was viewed as a huge barrier from the manager’s 
point of view: “If they don’t trust you, you’re sunk; especially surgeons. So over 
the last couple of years we’ve really worked to try to improve the trust.” (I.1 
Q139). 
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Negative consequences 
 
Prehospital 
GPs are responsible for instigating the referral process for patients who, 
according to their clinical criteria, need HKR. After WTMS started, GPs changed 
their way of functioning. One unanticipated and negative consequence of WTMS 
that emerged was that GPs lacked knowledge about the new referral process. 
However, there was no mention of any orientation program before the program’s 
implementation. It was therefore necessary to set up orientation programs on the 
key points of the program, resulting in increased expenditures on such programs 
aimed at GPs, who needed to be reminded on a regular basis of the new referral 
procedures for patients who might need HKR. The APP commented on the 
different alternatives used by the program to educate GPs: 
“You have to keep reminding them. They will flip back to their old ways of 
referring directly to the orthopaedic surgeon, because they forget. And so 
I’ve marketed them through various venues. I’ve gone to their various 
offices and hosted a breakfast meeting, a lunch meeting (…) I’ve gone to 
their summer school in the fall and given a presentation, I’ve done (…) 
grand rounds, a monthly presentation to the family physicians with Dr. X 
and Dr. Y, and we’ve been in the media quite a bit.” (I.8 Q59) 
This situation was linked to GPs’ resistance to this new program. Some 
respondents also saw their resistance as being related to the physiotherapy 
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assessments. One surgeon pointed out that GPs did not at all appreciate that their 
patients should be assessed by a physiotherapist: 
“But it’s difficult to tell a practitioner – a medical doctor – that they’re 
going to send their patients to a physiotherapist and the patient’s going to 
get more information than the medical doctor’s going to give them. So that 
takes a self-awareness on the part of the family physician that’s not 
common. So I think that my perception was that we may make more 
enemies than friends by saying, ‘Look, we can do a better job than you, let 
me teach you how to do this’.” (I.6 Q31) 
In addition, the GPs were under a lot pressure from patients, who wanted to 
get on the fastest list, whether with their preferred surgeon or with the first 
available surgeon. Patients did not really know the referral process; they just 
wanted an appointment with a surgeon:  
“You get people going through that (…). They might go on this list, but 
they also might then go to a different doctor, get a referral (…). They might 
go to their GP and get referred to X, but ‘Oh, that’s going to be 200 days, 
well (…) I’ll go to a walk-in clinic and get a referral to Dr. Y as well and 
see which one gets me in faster.’ We saw a lot of that with bariatric 
surgery, and I have the feeling some of that happens with joints.” (I.1 
Q153)  
On this matter, the manager stated:  
“The GPs have no idea whose wait time is the longest, and they don’t care 
for the most part (…). As a consequence, Dr. X receives definitely a 
disproportionate amount of the referrals in town, so that affects his wait 
times, too. They just refer on to whoever they’re comfortable with.” (I.1 
Q151) 
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GPs thus made double referrals because of their lack of knowledge about 
the program and their resistance to change, with the result that, in the end, wait 
times increased due to double referrals. 
Hospital 
The province’s lack of clarity as to whether the focus should be on higher 
volumes or reduced wait times caused negative and unanticipated consequences 
for the organization. One manager explained that this institution had two managers 
with different interests that, in the end, impacted negatively on the structure of the 
organization: "One of the managers is really tied to wait times. Me, on the other 
hand, if we’re getting our volume done, I can go back to the Ministry and say, 
well, give us more volumes.” (I.1 Q75). On the other hand, the manager of 
decision support felt that the goal was to reduce wait times: “The initial 
agreements that they were asking us to sign suggested that we had to hit the wait 
time targets in order to get the funding.” (I.9 Q100). Furthermore, the institution’s 
final goal was not taken into account by government, since policy-makers just 
wanted to achieve political goals such as reducing waiting times:  
“The government’s kind of funny in the way that they look at wait times, 
because they think that once they have solved the wait time problem, they 
should cut back the funding, because now it’s not paying for anything.” 
(I.1 Q146) 
Communication is always a challenge in any organization, even though it is 
known to improve outcomes. An interesting anticipated and undesirable 
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consequence was the lack of communication between OR nurses and floor nurses, 
both before and after surgery. One floor nurse commented:  
“Well, there really isn’t any communication between the operating room 
and [the floor]. The communication is the OR to recovery room, and then 
recovery room (...). We get our reports from recovery room.” (I.2 Q53)  
A nurse who worked on the floor receiving patients from the OR also 
stated that there was no communication with regard to bed availability:  
“We receive the patients, and that’s it! We receive the patients, we don’t 
have any input as to how many joints come in; those are all booked 
through the doctors’ offices with the OR, there’s no consultation with our 
unit at all.” (I.2 Q14)  
Independent practices have been shown to be associated with more medical 
complications. Nevertheless, some surgeons preferred not to be part of the team, 
for personal reasons not disclosed in the interviews. A surgeon from the team 
expressed his concerns on this particular issue: 
“Well, we had one surgeon that opted to separate from the group, which is 
very unfortunate, because I think it’s been very clearly shown in many 
studies that being an independent practitioner as a surgeon leads to higher 
complication rates, leads to a whole slew of issues that are best avoided 
(...)." (I.6 Q57) 
Even though patients were clinically assessed in order to detect co-
morbidity, some preventable medical complications did arise. One nurse spoke 
about medical complications that occurred even after pre-surgical assessment: 
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“You get the odd patient who may have a myocardial infract after their 
surgery. They get tachycardia or they’ve got some sort of underlying 
medical condition that either they haven’t identified before they’ve come 
in, so it shows up, of course, after they have their anaesthetic. PEs, DVTs 
sometimes.” (I.2 Q36) 
Another cause for concern was that the hospital had directed the extra 
funding for the OR to other needs and not necessarily to HKR surgeries. The chief 
of surgery said: “One thing that the orthopaedic surgeons probably resent is that 
the additional funding hasn’t flowed directly into the OR, it’s flowed up to... the 
total pot in the hospital.” (I.4 Q15). 
Surgeons preferred to keep their own wait lists, so that they could push for 
more individual OR time rather referring patients to other colleagues. The result 
was longer wait times. Moreover, there were no incentives to refer patients to 
other potentially available surgeons. The manager spoke about the lack of 
incentives to refer patients from surgeon to surgeon: “Right now the incentive is 
for surgeons to grow their wait list, but there’s no incentive for them to refer 
patients to other physicians, so…it’s a disincentive, right? So then patients wait.” 
(I.1 Q149). 
Some concern was voiced that using cheaper sets in surgery could be 
linked with increases in nosocomial infections. However, there was not enough 
evidence to support that idea. One surgeon deeply involved in this program 
commented on the link between cheaper sets and nosocomial infections: “They 
decided to go to a cheaper rate for the sets, and you hold them up to the ceiling 
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and you’d see a pinhole, and you’d say ‘Well, that set’s not clean’, but then you’d 
think, ‘How accurate a measure is that?” (I.6 Q80). He also said analyses were 
being done to find out whether there was an increase in nosocomial infections: 
“We’re currently investigating whether or not we’ve seen a real increase in 
infection rates. My perception is that that’s had a negative impact on our surgical 
site infections.” (I.6 Q79).  
One significant undesirable and unanticipated consequence was the fact 
that patient’s preferences increased wait times. They preferred going to the 
surgeon with the best reputation in the region, or to have their surgery done in a 
specific period of the year. The manager gave an example of patients’ preference 
based on the surgeon’s reputation: 
“Dr. Y, for example, the second-highest volume guy here – actually no, 
he’s the highest volume guy here for joints – is an excellent surgeon, but 
Dr. X has a better reputation, for whatever reason, in the community. So 
his wait time is usually around 160–170 days, whereas Dr. X’s real wait 
time is usually (…) closer to 230 days. So they say ‘Well, for another two 
months (…) I’ll just wait for Dr. X, it’s not a big deal.’ But to the Ministry 
(…) it’s hard for us to capture that.” (I.1 Q75) 
 
One surgeon shared his experience on how patients’ preferences increased 
wait times due to their preferences to have surgery done in a particular season of 
the year: “Most of our community would say, ‘I don’t want it done in the summer 
time because I don’t want to be away from this, I’d rather have it done in the 
winter.’” (I.6 Q50). He felt, on the contrary, that the system should manage 
surgeries based on the program, not on patients’ preferences: 
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“I’m going to mark you off the waiting list now because you’ve refused 
your op time and you go to the back of that list, and when it’s so sore you 
can’t speak, and then you’ll have it done at whenever a time is available.” 
(I.6 Q51)  
Furthermore, there were concerns about measuring patients’ satisfaction by 
taking into account only patients’ choices because experience had shown in this 
particular organization that it was not the most objective measure. One surgeon 
considered that patient satisfaction was not the best measure of the program: 
“I don’t think that that’s a reasonable measure for us to be targeting 
patient satisfaction, based on the fact that they got their operation at the 
time of year that they wanted? I mean (...) this patient-centred care is 
great, but it needs to be evaluated based on real things, not patient 
satisfaction.” (I.6 Q52) 
While flexibility around when patients have their surgery is important, it 
can have negative impacts on wait times that must be taken into consideration. He 
agreed that the program should have some flexibility, but not based on patients’ 
needs: “Should the patient be able to be in pain and get their operation in a timely 
way? – Yes. Should they have some flexibility in their times? – Yes. But in this 
hospital, from November until March we have a series of nursing home closures!” 
(I.6 Q52). 
Since this organization was seeking to improve HKR, the OR time 
distributions had introduced some inconveniences linked to inefficiency. First, the 
hospital needed to look after its own agenda and productivity, which caused some 
cancellations and delays in other waiting lists. The manager commented: “I only 
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have so much neurosurgery time I can give out. We need to have three 
neurosurgeons to have a proper neurosurgery program. I really can’t just take 
away one guy’s time and give it to the other guy, right?” (I.1 Q149). Second, they 
were facing an impending decrease in the number of anaesthesiologists because of 
retirements. Third, the hospital lacked the physical and organizational structure 
required to support increased demand for surgeries in HKR and other specialties. 
A surgeon said: “Not equally distributed, that’s distributed based on productivity, 
and that is given based on the hospital’s agenda, not on the surgeon’s agenda.” 
(I.6 Q49). Finally, one surgeon complained that OR time was being distributed on 
a limited basis:  
“The hospital is behind in joints. They don’t give it to the upper extremity 
surgeon, they give it to joint replacement surgeon. If the hospital’s had two 
complaints from spine patients waiting for their operation, they call up and 
say ‘OK, get these two people done’, and they give you more time for it 
(...). Micro managing OR time like that is a very inefficient way of doing 
things.” (I.6 Q50) 
 
Post-hospital 
There was no follow-up on nosocomial infections and rehabilitation 
processes. This meant there was less knowledge of the real impact of the program 
in the long term and on patients’ morbidity and mortality linked to HKR. A nurse 
in charge of discharging patients noted that there was no specific plan to follow up 
patients after surgery: 
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“I think if there’s sort of an infection post-op, I think the patient either 
goes to St. Joe’s or is discharged and then will come back, and they don’t 
necessarily come back to [this floor], they may go to any of the other 
surgical floors, so if there is an incidence of some infections, I don’t know 
about that.” (I.2 Q37) 
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4.2 Case 2 
Case 2 is a university hospital in Ontario with no emergency room or 
intensive care unit. It does not do complex surgeries, and its strategy is classified 
as sustainable. The program started in 2007. 
4.2.1 Unintended consequences at the systemic level 
Serendipities  
Even though advanced practice physiotherapists (APPs) have certain 
practice limitations, they became an essential part of the program in this particular 
institution. As a result, the Ontario Physiotherapists Association (OPA) was 
changing its regulations in order to provide them with better support and 
involvement in the WTMS program. An APP involved in this program 
commented: 
“In the College of Physiotherapists of Ontario there are some significant 
legislative changes that have happened in terms of communicating and 
diagnosis, and right now I'm pulled in to some of the work they're doing, 
where they're looking at the whole diagnostic piece and communication 
(...) in terms of the Ministry. So there are a lot of legislative changes that 
have happened (...).” (I.2.7 Q50)  
Since the WTMS program implemented educational programs for patients 
from different parts of the province, new job opportunities in local communities 
emerged, helping patients from distant locations to have access to these programs. 
The manager observed:  
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“Because our patients come from all over, it would be an extra trip to 
Toronto to come just for that class, so we’ve been working with a few 
Shoppers Home Health stores, and they will deliver the class now in their 
local communities.” (I.2.3 Q63) 
 
Trade-offs 
The uncertainty around being able to sustain the program in the long term 
was an anticipated negative consequence for this institution. They were not sure of 
getting recurrent annual funding from the province, as stated by the program’s 
medical director: “Right now, we continue to get annual funding, but we’re not 
sure obviously about what’s going to happen on a go-forward basis.” (I.2.4 Q62). 
In fact, the institution expected more funding because the program had been 
successful. The medical director, who was a surgeon as well, shared his experience 
on this issue: “You do something for five or six years and it’s really successful, 
you’d like to see someone say ‘That’s great, here’s the funding for it because it 
was just really good’.” (I.2.4 Q81).  
Another situation linked to the uncertainty of sustaining the program in the 
long term was the amount of bureaucracy between the Ministry and the hospitals. 
A surgeon involved in the program spoke lamented: “The trouble is that they’ve 
created another level of bureaucracy between the Ministry of Health and the 
hospitals. There’s this middle layer that’s got no authority.” (I.2.2 Q135). 
Unfortunately, there was no opinion from the Local Health Integration Network 
(LHIN) on this point. 
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Negative consequences 
One surgeon felt the Health Ministry should give them at least the same 
number of cases per year, instead of reducing them because the program had been 
successful:  
“Last year we got burned, because we went on a go-forward basis that 
they were going to give us the same number, but the Ministry decided, ‘No, 
we really want to spread it around (…) to more of the smaller centres’. 
And so they told us in December, ‘It’s too much, you’re doing a hundred 
more cases than you should’.” (I.2.2 Q128) 
 
The medical director also pointed out that the province’s WTMS policy 
was based on inaccurate data that did not take into consideration some patients’ 
behaviours that affected wait times:  
“If the data doesn’t allow you to enter that in a way that reflects the 
patient’s behaviour, then the system is blamed for inefficiency, when it’s in 
fact the patients that are the source of the problem; and that’s a constant 
problem for us in this whole model of care.” (I.2.4 Q71) 
There were increases in wait times for other specialties because 
government policy was mainly focused on WTMS in HKR surgeries. As such, 
there was limited funding from government to pay for more OR time for all 
specialties. The medical director considered that they were under significant 
pressure from the province to do HKR:  
“The pushback from the surgeons happens when the hospital says, ‘No, 
we’re not giving more OR time, but the government is giving us extra 
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money to do the hips and knees, so you have to cancel those other patients 
to do this’.” (I.2.4 Q87) 
4.2.2 Unintended consequences at the organizational level 
Serendipities 
This organization did not have any desirable and unanticipated 
consequences at the prehospital level. 
	   
Hospital 
Historically, the relations among some of the health professionals 
(surgeons, anaesthesiologists, nurses and physiotherapists) had not been very 
good. However, the program improved relations significantly and raised the level 
of confidence between surgeons and APPs. The APP involved in the WTMS 
program shared her experiences regarding the improvement in relations among 
health professionals: 
“We did some early research looking at level of agreement, just to build 
the confidence. So we really hadn't had that, it was like a brand new role; 
but we had all of the tools to show why it would be a good fit, and to gain 
their confidence. There’s a clear line of communication, everybody knows 
their roles.” (I.2.7 Q44) 
One unanticipated and desirable consequence was the creation of 
educational material for patients to improve their understanding of the pathway 
and the surgery: “We have written booklets for patients; we created a DVD that’s 
hip–knee.” (I.2.3 Q68). 
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There was greater efficiency in the OR thanks to a dedicated and cohesive 
team of specialized staff. That team work helped improve anaesthesia performance 
as well. One surgeon considered that, to maintain that success, it was important to 
have a permanent team working toward the same goals: “But you can’t maintain 
that kind of throughput unless there’s space dedicated, and equipment dedicated, 
and personnel dedicated to the anaesthesia part.” (I.2.2 Q73). 
APPs became an essential part of the program to improve communication 
with patients, who really like the APPs. The medical director, who also worked as 
a surgeon, spoke about the considerable role of APPs in this program:  
“Patients are happy to see the APPs, that they’re getting equivalent or 
better care for themselves. The comments that we got were, ‘The APP was 
able to spend some time with me’, or ‘I was able to ask some questions’.” 
(I.2.4 Q77) 
They were involved not only in the assessment centre, working actively 
with patients before surgery and in post-operative follow-up, but also in the 
assessment of x-rays for patients. One APP in this organization described their 
role: 
“(…) the advanced practice physios involved in the assessment centre – 
they're also involved in post-operative reviews, (...) we have telephone 
support (...). So, in other words, if somebody goes home, say, from surgery 
and they have a fall, (…) it's difficult to get to the surgeon. They have a line 
[where] they can call us, we can get the aid faster, if there are issues or 
flags that they need to be dealt with quickly, we get them in like that.” 
(I.2.7 Q52)  
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An example of APPs’ involvement in patient assessments was provided by 
the surgeon medical director:  
“I had a patient recently who fell at home, who came in, and the APP saw 
them, assessed them, ordered an x-ray. The radiologist misread the x-ray, 
the therapist sent me an email – I was away. She said, ‘You know, I don’t 
know what to do here, Dr.[X], because I’m sure this patient’s got a 
fractured femur, and I’m sure they’ve got a crack in their femur, but the 
radiologist says the x-ray is normal (…) no change from previous’. The 
APPs are really good, I mean they really pay a lot of attention to detail, 
you know? Sometimes a little too much, I think (…) personally, you 
know?” (I.2.4 Q78) 
This was an excellent opportunity for APPs to be deeply involved with the 
program. The APP shared her experience with the referral process: 
“We triage all the referrals, because sometimes family physicians will send 
something that's more urgent and it won't be flagged as urgent. It's been 
great for physios because – it's not for all physios – but it's (...) been sort of 
an opportunity for growth in that profession as well,” (I.2.7 Q52) 
The APPs had produced some scientific publications based on their 
experience with assessment centre using the APP model, which is an innovative 
branch of HKR treatment  in Canada: “The assessment centre and the feedback 
was really positive. The advanced practice physios have published a couple of 
articles on how this role evolved.” (I.2.3 Q63).  
APPs became important for patients in terms of better communication, as 
observed by the medical director:  
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"The APP clinic lists are shorter than ours, so they have fifteen minutes 
rather than five minutes. Ours were sort of built around five minute 
appointments and theirs are built around fifteen minute appointments so 
(…) after awhile when people come back repeatedly they go, ‘Well, this is 
great! There’s someone to spend some time with me, it’s wonderful’.” 
(I.2.4 Q77) 
This program had hired more nurses, giving them the opportunity to work 
and some economic stability: “Yes, we hired a part-time nurse, but it may 
eventually become a full-time nurse, which is important. It is important because 
the pre-op nurses also do cover the outpatient area.” (I.2.1 Q30).  
Since the organization’s culture had not been based on team work up to 
then, this program enhanced nurses’ confidence. Nurses now felt they were part of 
the team as surgeons trusted their opinions, which represented a significant value 
for this organization. This confidence and trust improved team work between 
nurses and surgeons, making a positive impact on the program. The nurse 
coordinator of the assessment centre commented:  
“We’ll say ‘recommend a pre-screen based on these findings’ and then the 
surgeon will order that, and they’ll get assessed by the anaesthesiologist 
and the medical doctor before they book in for surgery to make sure 
they’re okay.” (I.2.1 Q54) 
 Anaesthesiologists improved OR time by using regional anaesthesia 
without affecting patient safety, which had a positive impact on OR efficiency. 
The manager shared his experiences with this situation:  
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“They started the regional anaesthesia program here small. They showed 
that they could do it without having an impact on surgical time, and they 
could show also patient satisfaction and less complications, which help us 
get the patients up and going more quickly.” (I.2.3 Q115) 
This model has served as a role model not only for other programs, but also 
for different institutions in the same city and in other provinces in Canada: “A lot 
of them [are] using a model based on our model here.” (I.2.4 Q83). In fact, the 
organizational culture has been improving and the feeling of the team is better. For 
example, a surgeon commented that since the program started they now had 
annual gatherings, such as at Christmas time, to celebrate together: “There’s the 
commitment to the idea, and there’s a bit of a family feeling here.” (I.2.2 Q190). 
“Every Christmas time there’s a big party for the whole hospital. Everybody from 
the cleaner to the CEO is there.” (I.2.2 Q191).  
Trade-offs 
There were no anticipated and undesirable consequences at the prehospital 
level in this organization. 
Hospital 
As mentioned, there was some uncertainty about whether the program 
would be sustainable in the long term due to a certain level of bureaucracy 
between the Ministry and the hospitals. This uncertainty was an anticipated and 
undesirable consequence not only at the systemic level, but also at the 
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organizational level. As such, this bureaucracy impacted the sustainability of the 
program in hospitals.  
The program increased nurses’ workload in the assessment centre for HKR 
surgeries. This was an undesirable but anticipated consequence, because people 
were expecting increases in volumes for TJR. However, it stressed nurses’ 
workloads and added more physical demands, such as lifting patients and carrying 
heavy equipment needed for orthopaedic surgeries. The pre-op coordinator nurse 
shared her experience:  
“It is an added workload, and some days your demands on your time are 
just so great that sometimes we have to decline seeing some of the 
assessment centre patients because we just can’t cope with the volume and 
the number of issues that we’re dealing with. So there are times that you 
just can’t do that.” (I.2.1 Q53) 
In addition, they had to keep working not only with HKR patients, but also 
with short stay patients undergoing shoulder surgery or knee ligament repair. As a 
result, they reported emotional stress and physical exhaustion due to increase 
demands for lifting patients. One nurse spoke about her experiences with high 
volumes and heavy equipment: 
“And from an OR nurse’s perspective 200 joint cases are heavier on the 
nursing staff – lots of pans and instruments and stuff (…). Same thing on 
the units; on the units there was a mixture of patients – short stay patients 
– so if you had a shoulder surgery or a knee ligament repair, you were only 
here for one to two days and you weren’t very sick. So there was a mixture 
of patients, but now all the patients mostly had a total joint, so (...) 
definitely increased the work in both areas.” (I.2.5 Q25)
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This situation was also evident from the surgeon’s perspective, who 
observed that nurses had to work so hard on this program: 
“Well, (…) there can be 18, 20, 22 joints per day, it’s that little more 
stressful, it’s physically more demanding; and the nurses are not getting 
any younger and some would say ‘Yeah, that’s a hard day’s work’, okay? 
So (…) there may be some stresses like that.” (I.2.2 Q175)  
Even though the funding to sustain the program over the long term was 
uncertain, it also depended on getting the work done. If the organization worked 
hard to achieve the goals, the province would provide funding. Yet, to get that 
work done, the organization needed funding in the first place. This led to a vicious 
cycle, and ultimately to a potential stalemate, between the funding and the work of 
the organization. According to one surgeon, to get more funding, hospitals needed 
the collaboration of OR staff and enough equipment to do the job efficiently: 
“I guess the other thing was that additional money became available, but it 
was only available to those who could get the work done. So, again, it was 
collaboration – because you have to have enough OR staff, you have to 
have enough surgeons, you have to have enough equipment.” (I.2.2 Q125) 
The program met resistance at different levels of the organization. For 
example, some surgeons resisted hiring APPs instead of bringing on more 
surgeons to decrease wait times. From the APPs’ standpoint, there were different 
levels of barriers: 
“Yes, and there's barriers on different levels – there's system-level 
barriers, there’s organizational barriers, there's human barriers (...) you 
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know, human resource kind of factors, all the different levels, it's 
important.” (I.2.7 Q21) 
From the manager’s point of view, some surgeons were resistant: 
“Some of the surgeons said that the wait time strategy and the infusion of 
funds and the fact that they were able to recruit more orthopaedic surgeons 
meant that the wait times were down, so it was a waste of money to pay the 
salaries for advanced practice [physios].” (I.2.3 Q60) 
The program increased OR time for HKR surgeries, but decreased it for 
other types of surgeries. Consequently, there was a feeling of unfairness in the 
system. As the manager described it: “We’ve got some surgeons that have more 
access to OR time than other surgeons. So it creates a lot of tension amongst the 
group of surgeons.” (I.2.3 Q112). Some people had to wait for surgery for less 
time than others, who waited much longer. A surgeon recounted his experiences of 
this situation: “I think there’s still a few hard feelings here and there. Why should 
they have to wait nine months to a year? Whereas, somebody turns up in my clinic 
with a sore knee, I can organize their care in two or three months.” (I.2.2 Q164). 
It was not only nurses who were overworked, but also secretaries, who had 
to solve so many problems before patients went to surgery. Nevertheless, one 
secretary proclaimed: “We overcame it, and it seems to be working smoothly.” ( 
I.2.6  Q10).   
Negative consequences 
Prehospital 
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There was an increase in wait times in the referral process due to GPs’ not 
providing information to the central area, a behaviour that was linked to resistance 
to the program. This was an undesirable, unanticipated consequence. One surgeon 
spoke about GPs’ not following the referral process: 
“But I’m not sure the family doctors understand that what we’re trying to 
do is get all of the referral information into a central area. There’s a check 
box, a minimal amount of information is required for you to go through 
that, and if you provide that information, we’ll do our best to get your 
patients assessed either quickly, or by whom you request in a timely 
fashion; but it won’t be quickly and (…) it’s one or two, not all three. So I 
think that’s one thing that could be improved because they just don’t seem 
to get it.” (I.2.2 Q166) 
The GPs resisted the program and had concerns because they used to refer 
patients to the surgeon, and now patients were being assessed by APPs. The 
manager said: “So we did expect some grief from family physicians because they 
were referring their patients to a surgeon and they were being seen by an APP.” 
(I.2.3 Q118). The medical director reported GPs’ comments on this particular 
topic: “So initially we had and we still get occasionally – primarily from the 
family physicians (…): ‘I didn’t refer the patient to you to be seen by a therapist.” 
(I.2.4 Q77). 
Hospital 
Since this institution had no ICU, the program accepted only patients 
without co-morbidity. One surgeon commented on their selection process: “One: 
the staff are focused, the patients are selected, most of the people we operate are 
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kind of functioning okay.” (I.2.2 Q181). In addition, patients were rigorously 
assessed before undergoing surgery: “Everybody comes to the pre-admission visit; 
they’re seen by a nurse, anaesthetist, and here internal medicine, because we 
don’t have an ICU facility, so we need to screen people more carefully.” (I.2.3 
Q68). Thus, sicker patients have limited access to this program. The medical 
director spoke about patients’ pathways: 
"So now what happens is they get seen in the assessment centre, they do the 
anaesthesia questionnaire, so we know what their medical background is. 
If they have any medical issues, the nurse from the pre-assessment clinic 
comes and does a preliminary assessment. They get the information from 
their family doctor – or the cardiologist or whatever – and if it says 
basically they’ve got a grade three ventricle or a grade four ventricle, or 
whatever, we say, ‘Sorry, you can’t be seen here, we need to send you 
somewhere else.” (I.2.4 Q73)  
According to the medical director, patients did not use the assessment 
centre, even though it was available to them: “[In] the assessment centre (…) 
patients could be assessed within two weeks of referral; it was surprising to us 
how few patients actually (…) once they had access to care, didn’t take it!” (I.2.4 
Q64). 
Since the program took a great deal of the managers’ time, those involved 
with the program did not have time to share their experiences in scientific 
publications. The medical director stated:  
"One of my challenges here is that, because we’re all really busy, we don’t 
publish enough about our success. We’ve done some things in healthcare 
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management and so on, but not (…) We don’t have anything in the 
Canadian Journal of Surgery or Journal of Arthroplasty or any of those 
kind of things, right? I mean, I don’t have the time.” (I.2.4 Q81) 
Patient’s choices increased wait times and cancellations, such as when they 
preferred to have the surgery done at a specific time of the year, or by a specific 
surgeon. A pre-op nurse commented that although some patients might be willing 
to move to the next available surgeon, they generally preferred to wait for a 
surgeon with best reputation:  
“Now some people will say ‘Yes, I want that!’, and we have a little form 
they fill out saying that, yes, they are willing to change to the next 
available surgeon. And sometimes they do, sometimes they don’t, because 
they want to wait for that person.” (I.2.1 Q59) 
 Therefore, the program created the undesirable and unanticipated 
consequence of increased wait times due to patients’ choices. The medical director 
explained this unintended consequence:  
“The adverse effect is, ‘You’re not being efficient, you’re not doing what 
you told us you were going to do,’ and the answer is, ‘No, we can’t control 
patient behaviour; we cannot simply offer them the care’. (…) on the 
surgery side, if I say ‘I’ve got a cancellation, do you want come in next 
week?’ – ‘Oh no, like I got a holiday booked with my family and my niece 
is getting married in September, and then am I going to be ready if we’re 
going to Florida at Christmas. Maybe I should wait until next spring’.” 
(I.2.4 Q66)  
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Post-hospital 
The program had no plan to follow up patients. We considered this to be an 
undesirable and unanticipated consequence, because it is important to follow up 
patients after any strategy to know its impact on the community. Moreover, 
following up on patients helps in assessing the program and taking measures to 
improve it. However, the program informed patients to call to outpatient clinic if 
anything happened. The pre-op nurse coordinator commented on the fact that there 
was no specific plan to follow up patients: “Now the nurses are not in outpatients 
anymore, so we only get called to outpatients if they need us to help with the 
procedure, basically.” (I.2.1 Q33).  
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Figure 7 Summary of unintended consequences, Case 2 
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4.3 Case 3 
Case 3, a university hospital in an eastern province, is a reference centre 
for the province. Its strategy, classified as unlikely to be sustainable, started in 
2008. 
4.3.1 Unintended consequences at the systemic level 
Serendipities 
           
Even though the program was unsustainable, it introduced some 
improvements. The province lacked confidence in it at the beginning, but the 
program had some serendipitous consequences because the improvements it 
produced were unexpected. As the project manager stated: “In the beginning they 
gave us the minimum, and I think the success of the program in terms of reducing 
the wait time and over time reducing the wait list for surgery (…) then they see 
value in that.” (I.3.6 Q70). 
Trade-offs 
As the surgeon explained, the program was implemented, but in their own 
way that was not strictly in line with concept of sustainability as defined by the 
province: “It’s more from what it was supposed to be, so it is sustainable as a new 
definition, but it is not what it was meant to be.” (I.3.7 Q42). In fact, the program 
had serious problems of sustainability in the long term due to budget constraints. 
The chief of orthopaedic surgery considered that budget limitations, although 
undesirable, were to be expected: “We don’t have the money. Hospital budgets are 
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shrinking, and sooner or later that will impact on delivery of care.” (I.3.1 Q53). 
He also added that this had a negative effect on reducing wait times: “Then all of a 
sudden you have a problem with your budget. And so there’s always one other 
crisis within that circle in healthcare that affects the wait list.” (I.3.1 Q10).  
Another point related to the anticipated budget limitations is the 
competition among specialties for funding: “We’re always competing against 
these groups that are doing tough stuff too, and so it comes down to value 
judgments almost, as to who gets the resource, the limited resource.” (I.3.7 Q18) 
The manager spoke about how this competition involved lobbying: “The lobbying 
is happening with the Department of Health now; not just for ortho, but overall the 
numbers are creeping up.” (I.3.4 Q40). 
Negative consequences 
There was a gap in the health system because the program did not take into 
consideration non-surgical patients and their potential medical treatment. A nurse 
working in the pre-assessment centre said: 
“So it would be nice if there was a clinic in the system that can deal with 
your non-surgical patients that need more treatment, more time spent with 
them because if you don’t have RA you’re not a candidate to go to those 
doctors that will do the steroid injections. So there’s just a gap in the 
health system.” (I.3.5 Q57).  
From one surgeon’s perspective, there was frustration because decision-
makers sometimes did not really know what the problem was and did not have the 
academic skills to find solutions. In fact, the policies developed significantly 
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increased the bureaucracy. As a result, policies aimed at improving the wait list 
did not evolve: 
"It is so frustrating because you can do a lot of leadership here but the 
pieces in place to make it happen just really aren’t there, and there’s a lot 
of people in positions of authority who don’t know what they’re talking 
about – I’m sorry to say it but that’s a reality – they don’t have the training 
to do what they’re doing and they don’t have the information coming to 
them, and when they do, they don’t know what to do with it.” (I.3.7 Q22).  
 
The manager also pointed out that bureaucracy played significant role in this 
province: 
 
“Because we’re a pretty small province and our government is so close, 
there can be people who work here that are friends of people in the 
government, so we’d have people going through the back door. As an 
organization, if we try to implement something and they didn’t agree, and 
then they’d get the phone call; so that’s our old tradition.” (I.3.4 Q28) 
Money was also wasted, either when people with high levels of education 
were used to collect data, or when information was misused:  “We would have all 
been collecting the same data, it would have all been paid for, the secretaries 
would have run it for free basically because they liked it, it would have been really 
cheap.” (I.3.7 Q25). 
There were some concerns regarding the sustainability of the WTMS. For 
example, one surgeon was worried about having to increase volumes in order to 
get funding. He also had concerns regarding the concept of sustainability, 
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wondering how success in WTMS would be defined in relation to patients’ well-
being: 
“How are we going to deal with these politically incorrect issues, how do 
we deal with the patients’ issues, and how do we maintain this so we don’t 
lose the funding, and we don’t look like we’ve blown it or it’s not 
successful? That’s why I think a lot of people are putting up the metric for 
what is successful because T1 is down and patient satisfaction is very good 
– because they like the experience – so it’s hard to argue with that stuff, 
but is it worth it for the investment and the space we have and all that stuff, 
is it sustainable?” (I.3.7 Q51)     
Resources were taken away from some programs to sustain WTMS for 
HKR surgeries, increasing others’ wait times. The project manager stated: “The 
healthcare environment today is the real possibility of financial constraints in 
terms of taking away resources. Obviously our budgets are not growing; they’re 
actually getting less every year.” (I.3.6 Q63). Indeed, there was clearly a huge 
difference between the number of orthopaedic cases receiving attention and the 
number of cases in other specialties. The chief of orthopaedic surgery described 
his experiences: 
"Probably feel that the arthroplasty group is getting preferential attention, 
where foot and ankle has a huge wait list for surgery. Upper extremity has 
a huge wait list for surgery. If you looked at orthopaedics it was massive. 
You’d be talking eight or nine hundred patients on a wait list versus maybe 
thirty patients on a wait list for general surgery. Now the nature of their 
practice is different – so they just do cancer and crisis management in 
general surgery.” (I.3.1 Q8) 
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There was dissatisfaction with the healthcare system. The chief of 
orthopaedic surgery shared his views of a health system in which a combination 
both private and public practice would improve wait times: 
“Why should Canadian people go to India or someplace like Germany to 
get a total joint replacement and pay with insurance, when you could have 
that service in Canada with Canadian trained surgeons and nurses, in a 
private facility? If you mandated though that surgeons have to work 85% 
in the public system, and then you could work 15% in the private system, 
then I think the public health care would get looked after and people that 
want to [could] go to another alternate route.  And so if you provided a 
service to that population, then I think they would come out of the queue 
and those other people in the public would eventually move up the line.” 
(I.3.1 Q53)     
 
4.3.2 Unintended consequences at the organizational level 
Serendipities 
Hospital 
Managers at different levels of the organization are willing to improve wait 
times, and they are under significant pressure from the media. One surgeon noted: 
“(…) the willingness of multiple levels of management to get behind this and 
commit; the constant pressure [from] the media about the arthroplasty situation." 
(I.3.7 Q50). 
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The implementation of WTMS for HKR surgery helped to improve other 
programs in different specialties by serving as a model. The manager spoke about 
his experience in this organization:  
“So this strategy has helped us evaluate other programs; because spine 
has a huge wait time, and 95% of people that refer for spine surgery, don’t 
require spine surgery, they require conservative management, and that’s 
all over the literature. There’s been positive spin-offs from the strategy for 
other surgeries.” (I.3.2 Q98) 
The program developed new educational programs for patients, and the 
Department of Health was working on more programs to increase the 
understanding of a variety of healthcare programs. The project manager explained 
their work on the internet in regard to this issue: “[In] the education that we 
develop for the patients we actually work with the Department of Health and 
another initiative around the website – it’s called My Surgery” (I.3.6 Q79). 
Practice now is focused more on patients than physicians. A nurse in the 
pre-op assessment centre commented: "Really, most of the pathway is not around 
physician practice, it’s around good patient care." (I.3.4 Q26). 
Trade-offs 
There are no trade-offs at the prehospital level in this organization. 
Hospital 
The hospital is the largest in the province and receives patients from 
everywhere. As such, high patient volumes are an essential element to consider 
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with regard to WTMS for HKR surgeries. A surgeon spoke about his experiences 
with high volumes due to this hospital’s being a referral centre for the province: 
“We’re the only hospital in town, we’re really the only big hospital in the 
province, and I spend most of my time seeing patients who don’t come from 
this city, they come from other east provinces for second opinions if 
something’s gone wrong. Every time we take one of those patients here we 
bump someone from our city – the largest city in the Maritimes – who 
needs a joint replacement, because this is the only place they can go to get 
their joint replaced.” (I.3.7 Q18) 
Surgeons managed their own wait lists; the province had no control over 
that. A nurse in the assessment centre said: “That’s probably the biggest (…) I 
think that’s probably about the only complaint we hear at the clinic, and that’s not 
really anything we have any control over in our clinic.” (I.3.3 Q29). 
The old ways of doing things were deeply ingrained in nurses and 
surgeons. This program was based on efficiency and team work, which presented a 
real challenge from the personal and organizational perspectives. The manager 
considered that, from the nurses’ perspective, this new efficiency model required 
more work from them: 
“But the nursing staff feels that (...) ‘Well, we only did three in ten, why are 
we doing four in ten now?’ It’s an efficiency thing, so you might have to 
work, not a little faster, just more efficiently, and so changing practice is 
difficult.” (I.3.2 Q82).  
In addition, the organizational culture was characterized by individualism 
and lack of interest in efficiency. As such, there was resistance to culture change 
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that had a negative impact on results at the organizational level. The manager 
spoke about this resistance to changing the organizational culture:  
“Very difficult to change. You need a retirement to change culture here, 
it’s that entrenched. We have some people that have been doing surgery 
here for a very long time – 25-plus years – and they like it the way it was, 
and it’s very difficult to change.” (I.3.2 Q45) 
In addition, nurses did not want to be involved in the program. They just 
wanted to work with low levels of responsibility and to get out of the hospital as 
soon as possible. According to the manager, people in this organization were used 
to ‘working to live’, so they were not interested in having more responsibilities: 
“The culture here (…) that’s a difficult question. People here work to live, 
a lot of the nursing staff don’t feel ownership, so they come in for their 
work and they leave. They don’t join the committees to create change, 
professional practice committees, pathway committees. It’s very difficult to 
get nursing input outside of the work hours.” (I.3.2 Q51) 
According to the manager, there was a clear generational gap that created 
tension and decreased the program’s efficiency: “It’s a culture thing. It’s a 
generational gap as well, and we have a huge push right now to try to change 
things, but we do meet resistance from (…) the old boy’s club – if you want to call 
it [that].” (I.3.2 Q45). This tension increased resistance to moving from the old 
organizational culture to an efficiency-focused culture in terms of using 
technology, new medical protocols, transparency, and work in the OR: “That’s 
how I did my practice, [and] my patients heal well.” (I.3.4 Q26).  
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Nurses were overworked, doing many tasks at the same time in the 
assessment centre and in the hospital. The project manager commented: “There’s 
one person doing central intake for all the referrals. She does booking, she 
registers the patients, she gets the patients in the room, she weighs them, she gets 
their height, their BM (…) So, it’s a lot.” (I.3.6 Q78). 
There was significant resistance and tension between established and 
newer surgeons around new protocols and lengths of stay at the hospital. The 
project manager explained this resistance: 
“Well, some surgeons at first probably didn’t like that. Some surgeons 
didn’t really necessarily buy into the fast-track protocol. They felt that it 
was too soon. We didn’t get 100% agreement on all the practices, but they 
did come a long way, which is significant when we’re talking culture 
around surgical practices.” (I.3.6 Q46)  
Efficiency in OR time distribution was a challenge, since there were not 
enough anaesthesiologists. One surgeon noted: “Recently we had an anaesthesia 
shortage. At our hospital we lost thirteen anaesthetists, and so there were going to 
be some cuts.” (I.3.7 Q23). Decreases in the number of anaesthesiologists led to 
inefficiency in the OR. The chief of orthopaedic surgery commented: 
“You know, some anaesthetists left (…) and people will leave. Now you’re 
short of anaesthesia, so you decrease the amount of OR time. If you get the 
anaesthesiologist back (…) then you’re maybe short of nurses in the POC 
or the recovery room.” (I.3.1 Q10)  
According to the chief of orthopaedic surgery, there was also a low rate of 
employment for new surgeons and nurses:  
 92 
“Well, (…) 50% of the orthopaedic graduates cannot find a job in Canada. 
There’s all kinds of nurses that are looking for work, you know? There’s no 
jobs; there’s no jobs because there’s no money to pay them.” (I.3.1 Q54) 
There was also tension between managers and surgeons related to OR time, 
as described by the manager:  
“Some of the surgeons might not like me as an administrator because I’m 
managing that process, and (…) they might not appreciate that. So that’s a 
negative impact; it creates some negative working relationships.” (I.3.2 
Q91)  
This tension was also present among surgeons related to OR time 
distribution. The chief of surgery commented: 
“There was very little resistance among the other surgical divisions to 
allow orthopaedics to have more OR time. I’m sure that there were other 
divisions in the Department of Surgery that felt that we were getting 
preferential treatment by getting more OR time.” (I.3.1 Q8)  
There were limited beds on the floor and a high demand for surgeries from 
the emergency room. In fact, the ER had a protocol to occupy beds if patients 
passed a certain period of the time there, as explained by the manager: 
“Well, the emergency room has a mandate to get the patient from 
emergency room into a bed within a period of time. So if there’s an empty 
bed in the hospital – it doesn’t matter if it’s ortho, neuro, medicine, cardio 
– they’re going to that empty bed.” (I.3.2 Q87) 
 As a result, any bottleneck in the OR caused negative impacts on OR time 
distribution and sometimes cancellations. The manager stated: 
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"I wouldn’t say a lot of cancellations. There’s a lot of juggling around so 
that in the morning if there’s an extra medicine bed, we’ll take it and try to 
get that medicine patient moved so we can have it for the surgery.” (I.3.2 
Q89)   
Also, as the nursing manager explained, residents made rounds late, 
causing inefficiencies in bed planning:  
“Not all residents do rounds at the same time. Every service isn’t the same, 
and surgery does it earlier than medicine – because, technically, most of 
them are trying to get into the OR, right? So (…) medicine, it’s (…) well, 
very different, so it seems they do rounds at 8:00 or 8:30.” (I.3.4 Q46)  
Negative consequences 
Prehospital 
Wait times increased because of a lack of standardization in the referral 
process. One surgeon observed: “We don't have a standardized definition of who 
we're going to operate on, which would be useful, saying that you can't refuse 
someone just because of BMI, things like that.” (I.3.7 Q47). He also pointed out 
that referrals were being sent to specific surgeons because of their reputations, 
which in the end increased wait times:  
“You will be waiting longer than the target time just for a referral, and if 
that’s okay with you, fine, but you could go to a shorter surgeon, you could 
go to the next available at the orthopaedic assessment clinic if you choose 
(…), if you don’t want to wait. That’s the problem.” (I.3.7 Q31)   
This problem arose from a lack of knowledge among GPs that resulted in 
their resistance and consequent delays in achieving change. The project manager 
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added that referrals were sometimes incomplete: “And for those that were 
incomplete, then we would fax them back to say we will not be able to process it 
because it’s incomplete.” (I.3.6 Q20). He also noted that GPs preferred to refer 
patients to a specific surgeon, because that was the way they used to do it, and, as 
mentioned, they did not want to change: 
“(…) some physicians that had maybe long-standing relationships with 
some of the surgeons and surgeons’ offices, they would continue to fax to 
the individual office, which would kind of add another step, because then 
that referral would have to go over to the assessment clinic.” (I.3.6 Q21).  
A further delay in the referral process was due to GPs’ not using 
technology. The project manager pointed out that GPs could do the referral online. 
However, it did not work very well: 
"We actually worked with our IT team here and we developed an online 
referral database. So for physicians all across the province, they would be 
able to send their referrals directly to us online. Anyway (…) didn’t work 
so well.” (I.3.6 Q16).  
In addition, he stated that some GPs did not have computers to send the 
referral, which affected the efficiency of the process: “Some of the physicians 
didn’t even have computers in the office. I was kind of shocked about that (…).” 
(I.3.6 Q77). Moreover, a nurse in pre-op assessment noted that this increased their 
work, as time was wasted in using paper instead of IT: “(…) these mounds and 
mounds of paper that we’re having to deal with and we’re having to process all 
the time.” (I.3.3 Q31)  
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Hospital 
A significant unanticipated and undesirable consequence was misuse of the 
assessment centre by surgeons getting new patients for their own benefit instead of 
considering the community. A surgeon commented on this: 
“The clinic is not working the way it is supposed to work. And I don't have 
much to do with the clinic anymore, because (...) I'll tell you all the 
politics, but basically the individual I told you about, who was the shortest 
available, was the individual who kind of took over the project. And I didn't 
want to work with him, because I knew he had a vested interest. And he 
probably set it up because he saw it as a vehicle to get patients again.” 
(I.3.7 Q38)  
 
Since there was high demand for the program, there were increasing wait 
lists to see nurses at the assessment centre, to see surgeons, and for surgery. A pre-
op nurse pointed out that there were long wait lists for patients not only to see a 
surgeon, but also to be evaluated by a nurse in the assessment centre and for 
surgery, as well: 
“So it’s a little frustrating for patients that have been waiting for a year or 
two to see the surgeon, and then they have to wait (…) another year or two. 
So that’s kind of the negative thing. It would be nice if those patients that 
had the long wait to see the surgeon would have a shorter wait to have the 
surgery.” (I.3.5 Q61) 
A surgeon spoke about his frustration with this issue, in which surgeries 
had to be cancelled due to nurses’ not having enough time to teach patients: 
 96 
“I’ll see fifteen patients in a morning, and I’ll literally book twelve of them 
for surgery, and by the end of it I have to tell them to go home because the 
nurses are so far behind teaching the other person or (…) all my rooms are 
booked for surgery and the rest of the group are sitting there waiting to get 
into a room, but they can’t because all these people have to be seen by a 
nurse first to make the model work.” (I.3.7 Q30)  
There were increases in wait times due to patients’ preferences, when they wanted 
their surgery either at a specific time of the year or with a specific surgeon. One 
surgeon told us about his experience with patients’ choices:  
“When I get a referral to me, I say that you will be waiting longer than the 
target time just for a referral and if that’s okay with you, fine, but you 
could go to a shorter surgeon, you could go to the next available at the 
orthopaedic assessment clinic if you choose. If you don’t want to wait. 
That’s the problem.” (I.3.7 Q31)   
While wait times in other specialties increased due to funding being 
directed especially toward HKR, there were other reasons for this as well, such as 
inefficiency in the OR and lack of OR time distribution. The manager commented: 
“There’s always pressure for the OR time, but the arthroplasty group in 
our strategy has not negatively impacted those, they haven’t received more 
time that’s impacting the other surgeries (…). It’s not (…) negatively 
affecting spine surgery and ankle surgery. They still have their problems 
and their wait times – it’s more of an OR efficiency [issue] (…). Instead of 
doing all right knees on one day, they’ll do a right knee, then they’ll do a 
revision, then they’ll do a left hip, and then they’ll do a something; and it 
takes them 45 minutes to an hour to change that OR time.” (I.3.2 Q77) 
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The organizational culture affects the implementation of this new ‘culture 
of efficiency’. Furthermore, the organization itself has no clear goals, which also 
affects outcomes. Therefore, the program is not progressing quickly and changes 
are difficult to implement in this organization. One surgeon noted: “It is running 
the way it has for a while now. We've changed very little.” (I.3.7 Q44), and 
“There’s been no efficiency improvement.” (I.3.7 Q51). An example of this 
organizational culture was provided by the manager. He said nurses, rather than 
thinking about service to the community, were dissatisfied with the concept of 
efficiency because it increased patient volumes in a short period of time with no 
increase in their remuneration:  
“Well, it can create a little bit of tension, but again (…) that’s what we’re 
paid to do, right? We’re paid to care for the patient. So, I mean, if you 
always bring it back to the patients – and I always bring it back to, ‘What 
would you want for your mum or dad, or your grandmother, or whatever?’ 
– it does cause people to pause a little bit. But, you’re right, what is the 
reward I get as a nurse? Whether it’s (…) to discharge my patient quicker 
so I want to get another one, or get my discharge off the unit right away so 
I can get another… there isn’t [any]!” (I.3.4 Q42) 
The organizational culture was also characterized by tension between 
nurses and physiotherapists related to their roles in the program, because both felt 
they were capable of doing the same job. A surgeon observed: “There is a lot of 
turf war still going on between the nurse and the physio (…)” (I.3.7 Q45), and "I 
think there is some of that for sure. Because they both imagine themselves doing 
the role.” (I.3.7 Q46). 
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The manager noted that increases in morbidity/mortality rates in patients 
are not good indicator of outcomes: “… they say your morbidity/mortality goes up 
drastically once you’ve passed that 48 hours of waiting for surgery, so that’s our 
biggest focus.” (I.3.4 Q51). 
Some surgeons selected healthier patients for surgery, which had a 
significant impact on access to the health system. A surgeon commented on this: 
“We have one member of the group who has a very different threshold on who 
he’ll operate on, meaning he won’t operate on anybody who smokes, he won’t 
operate on anybody who has any weight issue.” (I.3.7 Q32). 
Finally, there was community resistance to the new practice. The manager 
commented on this particular issue: “The culture’s changing slowly. We in this 
city traditionally have had a varied culture of, ‘You come work with us and we’ll 
give you whatever you want’ and (…) we just can’t be in that business anymore.” 
(I.3.4 Q28).  
For example, patients expected to spend more days in the hospital after 
surgery, because in their culture longer stays in the institution meant better 
treatment and outcome.  The chief of orthopaedic surgery said: “The surprises 
maybe in the post-operative patient were that the patients were going home at four 
days. I think that surprised everybody, that they would go home.” (I.3.1 Q50). 
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Post-hospital 
There was a lack of standardization in following up patients in clinic after 
surgery. A surgeon noted: “We haven’t standardized that, you see? So it’s about 
getting them standardized and this is the problem we’re having because we can’t 
get consensus.” (I.3.7 Q60). 
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Figure 8  Summary of unintended consequences, Case 3 
(o) Role model for other programs and specialities
(o) Success in reducing WT, despite lack of trust
fromMinistry
(s) Uncertainty regarding program’s long-­‐term
sustainability due to budget constraints
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(o) Strong resistance from established organizational
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4.4 Case 4 
Case 4 is an orthopaedic surgery centre in Manitoba. Its strategy, classified 
as moderately sustainable, started in 2006. 
4.4.1 Unintended consequences at the systemic level 
There were no serendipities at this level. 
Trade-offs 
There was uncertainty regarding the program’s sustainability over the long 
term due to budget constraints. A nurse from the health authority commented: 
“The money that was put into orthopaedics through the wait times 
reduction fund was then put into our regular health planning and estimates 
process and have been funded through our estimates budget; so they’re not 
part of the ongoing annual budget of the organization. So the funding has 
been sustained for volumes and things like that, but because there wasn’t 
directed funding for some of the less tangible (…), the people-work side of 
it.” (I.4.1 Q18) 
There were gaps between political and public interests and between 
political and organizational interests with regard to WTMS. She added: 
“There’s a huge political driver around wait times/wait times management, 
and a huge amount of political sensitivity to what money they’ve put in, 
what volumes they get out, and what impact those volumes have; and 
they’re not at the level of, ‘Have we done the right thing?” (I.4.1 Q11).   
For example, spending money to decrease wait times may have more to do 
with political expediency than appropriateness, even though the latter could be 
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more important in terms of efficiency and effectiveness. Unfortunately, the public 
is more sensitive to volumes than appropriateness. A health authority nurse deeply 
involved in WTMS gave a clear example of the public perception of funding for 
WTMS: 
“It’s also much more difficult to communicate to the public the value of 
spending $100,000 on improving appropriateness versus the value of 
spending $100,000 on ‘and now you get a new joint’ for ten people right? 
Clearly the impact of an appropriateness activity would be much more far-
reaching than the ten joints for those ten patients. [We’re] trying to 
achieve the end, trying to achieve the goal of (…) improving access; not 
necessarily wait times management all the time, but improving access.” 
(I.4.1 Q11).  
The surgery program director agreed with this discussion of spending 
public budget on volume or product:  
“I would suggest that likely, in the coming years, things are going to be 
harder and harder and harder. Well, on the other hand, if there is a 
potential to save possibly millions of dollars, either a) in restricting choice, 
or b) not spending more that we’re already spending because we’ve chosen 
volume over product, those are our options.” (I.4.6 Q 56) 
There was a lack of accurate data and modern technology in other 
specialties, not only to know exactly how many people were waiting for 
procedures, but also to develop programs to improve wait times. The program 
director of surgery commented: 
“We don’t have the data on our other wait times. So again, we don’t have 
anything right now that’s through [the] central intake process. But (…) the 
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surgery program is also working on another initiative that goes along with 
general surgery, and that will be more focused around some of the cancer 
wait times, which I think is good. I think we have to, and why wouldn’t we 
want to? So, joints of course are important, but to me, it is not the only 
thing that’s important.” (I.4.6 Q58)  
 
As a result, health policies were focused on solving problems based on 
what could be done by the surgeon, rather than considering the true needs of 
patients or of public health. The surgery program director said: “Right now, we’re 
very organized around what can the surgeon do, what volume can they do, and 
what’s late, versus how many should be done.” (I.4.6 Q67). 
 
Negative consequences 
Sometimes media influence interest in some areas. A nurse from the health 
authority considered that the media influenced public and political interests, noting 
“the degree of media attention it has raised to specific areas and specific 
clinicians.” (I.4.1 Q41).  
As a result, the system was seen to be unfair when policies focused on 
HKR surgeries instead of other procedures. The regional director of surgery spoke 
about the unhappiness around this significant focus on HKR: 
“And there was lots of unhappiness in the system around all of the focus 
that orthopaedics was getting; I guess no different than cataracts, or 
cardiac, or DI or... but from the surgeon's world it was a bit of a challenge 
because particularly arthroplasty was getting a lot of attention, and you 
know... backs weren't getting as much attention and upper extremity wasn't 
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getting as much attention, and then the general surgeon wasn't getting as 
much attention.” (I.4.4 Q11).  
In fact, the program created an imbalance in the system and increased wait 
times in other specialties. In this regard, the surgery program director said: “So, as 
a surgery program director, not the orthopaedic program director, my interests 
are also broader. And I believe that there is a need to balance within our system. 
There is a finite value.” (I.4.6 Q57).  
However, there was no available data to confirm this perception. A health 
authority nurse commented: “I don’t think we have good strong evidence to 
suggest that focus on one area has resulted in growth of wait lists in another area 
specifically.” ( I.4.1 Q27)  
There was a perception that as great deal of funding had been invested in 
healthcare without any corresponding funding to evaluate efficiency. The manager 
considered that the money invested in health care could be used more efficiently:  
“I think we pay an exorbitant amount of money for some of our medical 
supplies, and I think that potentially you can create some efficiency there, 
but I don’t think that there is as much efficiency as some people may 
think.” (I.4.3 Q8).  
In addition, there was significant variability in the program due to budget 
fluctuations. The surgery program director offered a clear example of such 
situations: 
“There have also been times when we’ve said, ‘You’re only funded for, 
let’s say, 1000 joints (…), why are you tracking to more than 1000?’ And 
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then a month later, because we have a different mandate, we’ll say, ‘We 
need you to do 1500, get out there, and get these here.” (I.4.6 Q74).  
These variations in funding caused fluctuations in wait times. The manager 
also referred to this concept of variability: “There have been fluctuations of wait 
times going down, so theoretically when they go down it’s improved; but they’ve 
climbed back up again, so there’s pros and cons, it ebbs and flows.” (I.4.3 Q38). 
A significant negative, undesirable and unanticipated consequence was that 
the authorities constantly made changes to the strategies that varied the program’s 
outcome and exhausted the staff. The manager considered that this kind of 
vacillation would have a negative impact on the success of any strategy: 
“I think that changing strategies every one or two years is detrimental. I 
don’t think that we think about what we’re doing enough before we do it, 
and I think when we decide to do it, it takes too long to finally get it up and 
running and implement it. I think staff are leery because we historically 
keep changing gears and keep changing directions, and they’re getting 
tired of that.” (I.4.3 Q11) 
4.4.2 Unintended consequences at the organizational level 
Serendipities 
Prehospital 
The program was being used as a model for other programs to improve the 
referral process and dialogue with GPs. Two managers commented: 
“This is a good model, because it helps to ensure that there is a good 
distribution of who is receiving the referrals” (I.4.6 Q31). "I think there is 
 106 
more dialogue at least, and there’s more attention being paid to the pre-
surgical component of care versus just the surgery.” (I.4.1 Q24) 
Hospital 
The program for HKR patients was being used as a role model in other 
specialties. For example, general surgery changed its former model to respond to 
population needs: “Now the lessons learned out of ortho are certainly being 
applied across the board to many areas” (I.4.1 Q27). "That was really why we 
changed the footprint, because did we really need five sites doing after hours on 
call for general surgery?” (I.4.4 Q25). 
The medical director pointed out that the HKR program was an important 
model now being applied in other specialties in the organization, such as cardiac 
surgery and cancer: 
“I think we will get cooperation because our climate will make that 
apparent. Right now, orthopaedics has been a primary focus, I would have 
to say, within this province. I know that your interests expand beyond 
orthopaedics (…). So, as a surgery program director, not the orthopaedic 
program director, my interests are also broader. And I believe that there is 
a need to balance within our system.”  (I.4.6 Q57) 
 
 
Trade-offs 
There were no trade-offs at the prehospital level in this organization. 
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Hospital 
One anticipated and undesirable consequence was some surgeons’ 
resistance to the new culture of efficiency and to working as a team in the OR. The 
manager observed that the health professionals preferred to work as they used to 
and did not like changes: “They’re very reluctant to change; they’re very stuck in 
their habits.” (I.4.3 Q18.) One employee at the health authority considered that, in 
this province, health professionals  tended to be individualistic: “Orthopaedic 
surgeons don’t work collectively as a group, they work as individuals.” (I.4.1 Q 
3). The result was tension between managers and some surgeons, and among 
surgeons. The manager pointed out that health professionals, especially surgeons, 
preferred to work on their own: “There’s resistance to authority, there’s a 
resistance to change; everybody wants to do their own thing without anybody 
telling them what to do, and because of that it’s a real challenge to really get buy-
in.” (I.4.3 Q17)   
A clear example of this was the tension between academic and non-
academic surgeons with regard to economic resources. As the medical director 
commented:  
“I would suggest there are probably also tensions among that academic 
group and this academic group, and then the non-academic group. So 
there is a lot of healthy tension, or unhealthy tension, I would have to say. 
Everybody feels the grass is always greener on the other side. Everyone 
feels somebody else has something better, or there is a reason why, if they 
think they have something better, it is because they’re doing something 
special. So that’s most definitely alive and well.” (I.4.6 Q48) 
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He also said this tension was due to academic surgeons apparently having 
more resources than non-academic surgeons: 
“There are tensions, and again, if this is the academic group, then the 
other surgeons would say they have more resources available to them. But 
most definitely, I would have to say that there is a rift between the two 
groups.” (I.4.6 Q39) 
 
Because people had different economic interests, values and goals, it was 
an undesirable and anticipated fact that achieving institutional goals was a huge 
challenge. Moreover, there was a perception that surgeons’ primary motivation in 
the program was self-interest, rather than patients’ best interests. A health ministry 
nurse commented: 
“We’re not using our resources effectively, we’re not doing what’s right 
for the patients, we’re not doing what’s right for each other (…). That 
piece I don’t think people have embodied or valued, and to me that’s one of 
the challenges on why we can’t sustain this, because we don’t have people 
aligned on the goal, the goal isn’t the same rule for everybody. The idea 
that surgeons were going to get more cases had a huge impact on whether 
or not they were willing to participate.” (I.4.1 Q 9) 
A manager at this hospital considered that surgeons were more focused on 
their important economic interests than on the success of the program: 
“They make their money off of each case, or consult, or every individual 
type of work or thing that they do – that is their single most important 
motivating drive and force. So all physicians at the end of the day are 
focused on that. I think patient care – unfortunately and not intended – is 
second to that, and it’s a very close second, but I think it is second. Now, 
 109 
that’s not to say that they would do something intentionally negative in a 
patient’s regard, but I think that money is the single driving force there, 
and because of that, they look at the world from that perspective. So they 
do things that make them money, and have impact on that. If it has a 
negative impact on their, money they’re going to push back.” (I.4.3 Q21) 
With the expected increase in volumes, the overload for physicians’ 
assistants and nurses was associated with emotional and physical stress. The 
manager pointed out that, because many patients are obese and orthopaedic 
equipment is big, “workload for them has increased exponentially.” (I.4.3 Q27). 
In addition, a clinical nurse manager noted that companies are not making lighter 
equipment that would make the nurses’ job easier:  
“The companies that make this equipment, they're not making [it] any 
lighter. We keep telling them to make it lighter because the OR nursing 
population is getting older. I mean, there are over 50% of us that are over 
50 now.” (I.4.7 Q69)   
The regional director of surgery added that OR in orthopaedics is hard 
work: “In the OR it's hard work, all those pans of instruments are hard work. 
Orthopaedics is hard work in general, revision cases sometimes have, like, 16 to 
17 pans of instruments; that is hard work for the staff.” (I.4.4 Q49). This reality 
was also noted by a clinical manager who was coordinating an OR in another 
organization in the same city. Patients are obese and nurses are getting older, such 
that the physical demands on nurses to lift patients can cause workplace injuries: 
“You can go to (...) ORNAC, AORN and they'll all tell you the same – that 
the population is increasing that the age is increasing of the OR nurse. So, 
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you know, we're all getting older, we're all used to do this, right? And it's 
all repetitive work and it takes its toll.” (I.4.7 Q70) 
She also gave a clear example of this situation: 
“Yeah, I mean, we have three nurses in a room, but you know some of 
these cases are very (...) there's lots of pans of instruments. Some of these 
patients are big, they're obese, they've got a lot of problems and it takes 
time. What might have taken two hours, you know, on a normal sized 
individual is now three hours on an obese patient, you know. So it takes its 
toll.” (I.4.7 Q 72) 
Patients had strongly contrasted feelings about the program, being either 
extremely satisfied or frustrated, a reaction that was both anticipated and 
undesirable at the same time. However, because patients had different points of 
view, making everyone happy was practically impossible. As the orthopaedic 
administrative manager pointed out:  
“I think some patients are probably extremely satisfied and happy with the 
process, and others are probably extremely frustrated with the process. So 
I’m not too sure you could paint the entire group with one brush. I think 
you will always have pockets of satisfied (…) and then also pockets of 
deteriorating situations.” (I.4.3 Q 38) 
As mentioned, this organization’s culture was not very open to changes. 
People preferred to work as they had been doing, even if new models and 
strategies based on efficiency were demonstrably better. In this sense, older 
surgeons just wanted to keep working as they always had. They were not very 
involved in WTMS because they had different interests and goals. The nurse 
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clinical manager observed: “(…) it's an older group, different interests. ‘I'm just 
going to do what I need to do to keep going.’ Interestingly enough, one of the ones 
here who regularly does four joints in a day is one of the ones thinking about 
retiring.” (I.4.7 Q50). 
Orthopaedic surgeons received funding for HKR surgeries to improve wait 
times. As a consequence, they got new equipment and staff. Other surgeons’ 
feelings about this were not positive, as the manager confirmed: “That’s how the 
general surgeons viewed it, that the orthopaedic surgeons got all the new 
equipment, they got the new OR, they got the new toys, (…) they felt that they were 
getting preference to slating times.” (I.4.5 Q16). He also mentioned that the 
organization spent much more money on orthopaedic needs than on other 
specialties: “If the general surgeon wants something, and we can’t buy it right 
away, they say, ‘Well, if I was an orthopaedic surgeon, you would buy it.” (I.4.5 
Q17). 
Post-hospital 
A surgeon noted that there was no data on follow-up of patients. In fact, 
there was no particular plan to do it:  
“It’s a real challenge to do that because patients get discharged and they 
can go anywhere for follow-up. They can go to an emergency department, 
they can go to their surgeon, they can go to a family doctor, they can go to 
a walk-in clinic. We have no reliable way of collecting data from all those 
points (…) to track it.” (I.4.2 Q67) 
 
 112 
Negative consequences 
Prehospital 
Patients did not understand the referral process very well due to lack of 
communication and inappropriate use of the referral process by GPs, so they 
engaged in behaviours that increased wait times, such as seeking referrals from 
more than one GP. One surgeon considered that this communication problem had 
a negative impact on the referral process:  
“Basically given the validation reference we’ve made, when repeated in 
many other areas, we see a range of between 20% up to 50 and 60% of 
inappropriate referrals being made and inappropriate patients sitting on 
wait lists.” (I.4.1 Q40).  
There was also a perception among GPs that they were not getting value 
from the assessment centre. This added to their resistance to the referral process. A 
nurse from the health authority concluded that GPs did not like HKR referrals 
being filtered: 
“They felt that was a filter before patients could actually go on to be 
assessed by a surgeon, and in some cases those family physicians believed 
that was their job to have done, that they should have completed that work 
prior to ever making the referral, and therefore that filter wasn’t required; 
so they were a bit unhappy that that filter was being applied.” (I.4.1 Q21)  
 
GPs referred patients to their preferred surgeon, even though they knew 
about the central intake to improve wait times. In fact, they actually could refer 
patients to whomever they wanted: “If you’re a family physician and you’re 
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referring someone, you rely on who do you know, who have you heard about… 
because it is too difficult to keep on top of all of the specialties and who is out 
there.” (I.4.6 Q28).  
Hospital 
When WTMS started in this organization, specialties in this hospital had to 
be reorganized in order to optimize resources. As a result, some services were 
moved from this facility to another. This was considered an unanticipated and 
undesirable consequence because managers did not take into consideration patients 
in specialties such as urology and odontology. As the regional director of surgery 
explained: “So, when we were moving orthopaedics around, you can't move 
orthopaedics without touching something else, so there were a couple of 
consequences, and we lost urology, we lost dental.” (I.4.4 Q25). 
There was a bottleneck at the assessment centre due to high volumes. As 
one surgeon explained: 
“Four years ago we really ramped up volumes, did a lot of double days, 
did a lot of volumes, got our wait list down (…) and, all of a sudden, you 
get to the point where you’re trying to get people off of your wait list into 
the OR, and the system is set up for a year-long wait.” (I.4.2 Q15)  
A major undesirable and unanticipated negative consequence was an 
increase in wait times due to patients’ preferences regarding timing and surgeon. 
Patients preferred their surgery to be done at specific times of the year, or with a 
specific surgeon. This resulted in a waste of money and resources. A health 
authority nurse considered that this was a fact of life, and that patients wanted their 
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surgery to be done by the surgeon with the best reputation in the region, even if the 
rest of surgeons were equally qualified: 
“Certainly, patient preference and patient direction has been a huge 
challenge. The patients, obviously, in hearing that so-and-so is ‘the best’ at 
something, always want to go to ‘the best’, not to the other 20 who are 
equally qualified and maybe not ‘the best’, but certainly are still 
credentialed and privileged.” (I.4.1 Q 3) 
A surgeon shared the same opinion, saying: “We moved here, and it 
seemed like the whole city thought that the only place you could have your hip or 
knee done was here at [X] Hospital.” (I.4.2 Q15).     
Orthopaedic surgeons did not consider themselves active members of the 
team and were not particularly interested in the program: “[The] surgeon isn’t an 
active member of the team necessarily; they’re just kind of accepting the results of 
that team.” (I.4.1 Q24).  
A manager shared his ideas about the misconception that a successful 
strategy would focus only on reducing wait lists. He raised the question of whether 
a strategy should be considered successful just because it reduced wait time, and 
whether there might be another way to develop a successful strategy: 
“I would like to see an overall reduction of wait times for all patients 
across the board. I think you also have to have satisfactory patient 
outcomes and satisfied patients at the end of the day. I think that you have 
to have your entire process firing on all cylinders. You can’t just have a 
specialized area of focus doing good work; it needs to be everybody across 
the board doing good work, because that way it’s by driving down those 
wait times [that] you’re more sustainable over the long term. If you have 
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just pockets of people doing good things, I don’t think that’s sustainable 
over a long period of time because, again, surgeons, nursing staff and 
hospital staff are only human, you can only expect so much from them. 
Either you’ll see the increase in burn-out, you’ll see the increase in 
psychological, mental health issues, so I think you’ve got to look at that 
across the board.” (I.4.3 Q7)  
The manager considered that fluctuations in strategies had both positive 
and negative impacts on patients’ satisfaction depending on the timing of the 
implementation: 
“There have been fluctuations of wait times going down, so theoretically 
when they go down it’s improved; but they’ve climbed back up again, so 
there’s pros and cons, it ebbs and flows. I think some patients are probably 
extremely satisfied and happy with the process, and others are probably 
extremely frustrated with the process.” (I.4.3 Q38) 
 
Even though the APP model has been successfully used in different 
organizations, this institution did not include any APP because of a different 
perspective regarding its efficiency. The regional director of surgery explained 
why the APP model was not selected:  
“It wasn't the model that we selected; the model we selected was based on 
an inter-professional team. So I'm not even sure (...) I don't even think we 
have an advanced practice physiotherapist that exists in the province; so 
that's something that their discipline needs to deal with. So we have a 
physiotherapist, an occupational therapist, a nurse, a social worker, a 
dietician (...) We have a psychologist, but we don't have an advanced 
practice physiotherapist.” (I.4.4 Q40) 
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A general surgeon agreed with the manager, saying that the APP model did not 
make sense for them. Instead, they preferred to invest in surgeons to do 
consultations: 
“Does it make sense to employ somebody, pay the rent, secretarial support, 
run a clinic (…) to maybe take that 20% down to 10%? We thought really, 
it doesn’t. You should just pay the surgeon fifty bucks for their surgeon 
consultation fee. They’ll see the patient, and away they go.” (I.4.2 Q79) 
 
Finally, there was a negative impact on patients’ safety, in that economic interests 
led to lesser quality materials being used for surgery. The program director of 
surgery commented on the risks of not having good quality joint replacement 
equipment in HKR surgeries:  
“To me, you see, I think this is always an interesting debate because we 
also right now don’t have a standard joint replacement system that will 
only use this, or this, or this. We encourage people, of course, to be 
mindful of what implant they’re selecting. However, we don’t mandate it.” 
(I.4.6 Q51) 
He also admitted that individual choices regarding equipment could have a 
negative impact on patients’ safety: 
“I think there is a risk for patients, because so much of the rest of the team 
then have to adapt to each individual surgeon. I think it causes some lack 
of control. For me, I would say the best argument is, if we’re going to say 
that we’re funded for a certain volume (…) this is the funding envelope and 
here are our options. Our options are: we could do this number, or we can 
reduce our number because we still have to come in into this target. I don’t 
advocate for the lowest is the best, and I don’t even advocate to say it 
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should only be one system. I think there can be some variety, but (…) there 
needs to be some mindfulness to it. What are the selections? And why?”  
(I.4.6 Q54) 
 
Figure 9  Summary of unintended consequences, Case 4 
(o) Role model for other programs
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sustainability due to budget constraints
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(o) No planning to follow-­‐up patients
(o) Lack of involvement from some surgeons
UC	  of	  WTMS
Case	  4
SERENDIPITIES
TRADE-­‐OFFS
NEGATIVE	  CONSEQUENCES
INTENDED	  
CONSEQUENCES
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Chapter 5 Analysis of Results: Unintended consequences  
The unintended consequences of strategies to improve wait times for HKR 
surgeries in Canada’s healthcare system have not been studied in research projects 
in depth. A review of the literature revealed that some elements have been 
explored, such as the consequences of quality of care measurements (Casalino, 
1999), the effects of using technology in health services (Campbell et al., 2006), 
the impacts of social and economic policies on healthcare systems (Berkman, 
2011; McDonald & Roland, 2009), and the consequences of health reforms 
(Thrall, 2011). There has also been significant research interest in the 
consequences of strategies to improve wait times in HKR surgeries. Studies have 
described potential increases in patients’ pain and decreases in their satisfaction 
(Bruni et al., 2010; Nilsdotter, 2002). There have been studies looking at equity 
issues related to the strategies (Noseworthy, 2003) as well as at increases in costs 
for the healthcare system (Masri et al., 2005) and the side effects of marketing the 
strategies (Fry & Polonsky, 2004). However, to date there has not been much 
evidence on those strategies’ unintended consequences as seen through the lens of 
the framework and approach used in this thesis. 
In the framework adopted here (Figure 4), the potential unintended 
consequences of WTMS are classified as serendipities, trade-offs, and negative 
consequences. While there are three levels of healthcare organizations, this thesis 
focused specifically on the systemic and organizational aspects of UCs. 
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The contribution of this study lies basically in two main areas. First, the 
review of literature on unintended consequences linked to health issues suggested 
a new approach and perspective for exploring this matter comprehensively. The 
second contribution lies in the originality of the approach of classifying the UCs of 
WTMS in HKR as serendipities, trade-offs and negative consequences at the 
systemic and organizational levels. Not only do these two elements contribute to a 
better understanding of WTMS, but they also suggest the value of applying this 
perspective to other potential strategies or issues in health services. 
The results of this project are presented in terms of these three variables: 
serendipities, trade-offs, and negative consequences. The quality of the study is 
also enhanced by analyzing the perspectives of people involved in the program at 
different levels of the organizations. 
After reviewing the four cases, we highlighted the UCs they had in 
common. Each particular case also had specific UCs of using WTMS depending 
on its cultural, social, economic and political context.  
In the process of developing this master’s thesis, we encountered three key 
challenges: First, it was a challenge to differentiate between initial factors linked 
to WTMS and the consequences of those strategies. In coding and analyzing 
results, we began by selecting parts of the interviews related to potential 
consequences. However, some of those consequences proved, in the end, to be 
factors. As a result, we had to re-read the interviews and consequences many times 
to be sure factors were not selected. Second, after reviewing the potential 
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consequences of using WTMS, we started to identify among them serendipities, 
trade-offs, and negative consequences. It was not clear what the key elements were 
to distinguish among them. Our framework (Figure 4) allowed us to classify the 
consequences according to whether they were desirable or not, and anticipated or 
not. Moreover, a panel of experts helped us to understand the different types of 
unintended consequences at the systemic and organizational levels. Third, the 
analysis of unintended consequences presented some problems, in that it was 
difficult to identify the systemic and organizational consequences of each 
institution. In fact, we had to discuss these with key informants to be sure our 
analysis was based on the right elements.  
The analysis of results is presented in three parts. First, we analyze the 
general unintended consequences of the four cases at the systemic and 
organizational levels, and then the similarities and differences across the four cases 
in terms of serendipities, trade-offs and negative consequences. Second, we 
consider the results of each case in terms of sustainability. Finally, we analyze the 
noteworthy differences and similarities among cases in relation to their 
sustainability.  
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5.1 General UCs at the systemic and organizational levels across 
the cases 
Systemic level 
We did not identify significant unanticipated and desirable consequences at 
the systemic level. As for trade-offs, which are expected and undesirable 
consequences,  certain points should be noted. Bureaucracy played a significant 
role in all provinces and had a negative impact on new programs and strategies 
aimed at efficiency. The policies established by the provinces were based on a 
philosophy of doing more volumes without taking into account patients’ needs, 
which had negative impacts on the planning process in different organizations. 
Moreover, we saw in all the cases that there were gaps between political and 
public interests and between political and organizational interests with regard to 
WTMS. However, there was not enough information from this study to clarify and 
understand these gap. Health policies were focused on solving problems based on 
inaccurate data or lack of knowledge of the real situation in each province. On the 
other hand, there were also unanticipated and undesirable consequences at the 
systemic level. The most significant negative consequence was that economic and 
human resources were targeted at improving wait times in HKR without taking 
into account the consequences for wait times in other specialties. As a result, 
significant numbers of patients were affected in terms of morbidity and mortality, 
although there is no accurate data to confirm this. There were concerns raised 
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regarding WTMS sustainability. Is this model sustainable? Should we define a 
sustainable strategy as being successful without taking into account a number of 
factors around organizations? The model used to develop the WTMS was based on 
a policy that considers a strategy to be sustainable and successful if it achieves a 
federal benchmark.  
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Table 5 General UCs at the systemic level 
Serendipities • None 
Trade-offs • Concerns about the sustainability 
of the program in the long term, 
mainly due to budget constraints 
since there was no money for 
equipment, sets and personnel. 
Also, not enough funding to 
improve accuracy of data for 
better understanding of wait 
times. 
• Philosophy underlying provincial 
policies unclear in terms of doing 
more volumes vs. working on 
wait times, requiring 
organizations to work in two 
opposing directions. 
Negative • Increases in other wait times due 
to funding being taken away 
from some programs and 
redirected toward HKR. 
• Patient’s preferences caused 
increases in wait times, as 
patients sometimes preferred to 
have their surgery done at a 
specific time of the year or with a 
specific surgeon. 
 
• Health policies were biased 
because policy-makers were 
using inaccurate data. 
Organizational level 
Unanticipated and desirable consequences or happy surprises within 
organizations were very common. For example, WTMS was used as a role model 
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in different programs in the same organization, as well as in other hospitals. There 
were improvements in team work and communication between health 
professionals, although this required ongoing attention and commitment. 
Regarding unanticipated and undesirable consequences, it is essential to take into 
consideration the organizational culture. In fact, it directly influences outcomes. 
For example, the organization with higher levels of trust and confidence had better 
results achieving the federal goals than those institutions with serious difficulties 
around this particular issue. Moreover, resistance to change was seen in those 
organizations whose culture was characterized by individualism, lack of interest 
for patients’ needs and attachment to the ‘status quo’ rather than by team work, 
compromise and concern for patients’ interests.  
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Table 6 General UCs at the organizational level 
Serendipities • The referral process for hip and 
knee replacements was used as a 
role model in all cases to improve 
other programs.(Prehospital 
level) 
• The program increased the 
opportunity to hire more nurses 
to work at different points of the 
patient pathway, from the 
assessment centre to the OR and 
post-op.(Hospital level) 
• Team work in the OR improved 
outcomes and 
efficiency.(Hospital Level) 
Trade-offs • GPs resisted changing their ways 
with regard to the referral process 
(Prehospital level) 
• Tension among surgeons, 
between nurses and surgeons, and 
between anaesthesiologists and 
surgeons (Hospital level) 
• Stress and resistance to change 
(Prehospital and Hospital levels) 
• Bottleneck in OR due to low 
number of beds and high demand 
on surgeries from ER and 
outpatients (Hospital level) 
 
Negative • Increases in wait times due to 
double referrals from GPs, 
insufficient knowledge and 
resistance to change (Prehospital 
level) 
• Increase in wait times due to both 
inefficiency in the OR and 
patient’s preferences (Prehospital 
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and Hospital levels) 
• No plans for following up 
patients after surgery (Post-
Hospital level) 
 
5.2 UCs of using WTMS according to sustainability 
This section considers the unintended consequences in the four cases based 
on their sustainability, in terms of serendipities, trade-offs, and negative 
consequences at the systemic and organizational levels. 
5.2.1 UCs of the sustainable case 
Table 7 UCs of the sustainable case - systemic level 
 
Serendipities • More jobs in local regions 
Trade-offs • Uncertainty regarding 
sustainability of the program in 
the long term. 
Negative consequences • Increases in wait times in other 
specialties due to the policy 
being more focused on HKR 
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Table 8 UCs of the sustainable case - organizational level 
 
Serendipities • Educational material for patients 
• Cohesive team in the OR 
• APPs an essential part of the 
team 
• More jobs for nurses 
• Significant improvements in the 
culture of the organization 
Trade-offs • Nurses overworked 
• Stress 
• Resistance and tension among 
health professionals 
Negative consequences • Increase in HKR wait times due 
to inconsistency in the referral 
process and patients’ preferences 
• Adverse selection favouring less 
sick patients 
• Less time for consultation with 
surgeons 
• No follow-up of patients after 
discharge 
 
5.2.2 UCs of the moderately sustainable case 
Table 9 UCs of the moderately sustainable case - systemic level 
 
Serendipities • None 
Trade-offs • Uncertainty regarding 
sustainability of the program in 
the long term. 
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• Lack of accurate data 
Negative consequences • Increase in other wait times 
because money is taken away 
from other programs and 
reallocated to HKR. 
 
Table 10 UCs of the moderately sustainable case - organizational level 
Serendipities • Program used as a role model 
Trade-offs • Lack of knowledge of the referral 
process by GPs linked to 
resistance to change 
• Tension between 
anaesthesiologists and surgeons 
and among surgeons 
• Increase in wait times due to 
inefficiency in the OR 
• Nurses overworked 
• Lack of communication among 
nurses 
Negative consequences • Double referrals made by GPs 
• Increase in wait times due to 
patients’ preferences 
• Bottlenecks in the OR due to 
high demand for surgery and lack 
of beds 
• Negative impact in terms of 
nosocomial infections linked to 
cheaper instruments for surgery 
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5.2.3 UCs of the two unlikely to be sustainable cases 
Table 11 UCs of the two unlikely to be sustainable cases - systemic level 
Serendipities • Program succeeded despite lack 
of trust 
Trade-offs • Uncertainty regarding program’s 
sustainability in the long term 
• Competition among specialties 
for funding 
Negative consequences • Gap for non-surgical patients 
• Lack of recognition of the real 
wait time situations 
• Bureaucracy 
• Money wasted collecting 
inaccurate data 
• Concerns about the concept of 
sustainability 
• Increases in wait times in other 
specialties due to funding 
redirected from one program to 
another. 
• Dissatisfaction with the health 
system 
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Table 12 Unintended consequences of the two unlikely to be sustainable cases - 
organizational level 
Serendipities • Program served as a role model 
• Educational programs for 
patients 
• More focus on patients 
Trade-offs • Lack of knowledge of the referral 
process among the GPs. 
• Resistance of GPs 
• High patient volume due to being 
a provincial reference hospital. 
• Status quo culture vs. new 
efficiency culture 
• Resistance to change by 
established surgeons and nurses 
• Generational gap in terms of 
efficiency that caused tension 
• Inefficiency in the OR 
• Tension among surgeons 
• Limited number of beds 
• Bottleneck in the OR due to high 
demand for surgery and lack of 
beds 
Negative consequences • Increase in wait times due to lack 
of standardization of referral 
process 
• Misuse of the assessment centre 
• Wait lists for patients to see 
nurses 
• Increase in wait times due to 
patients’ preferences and 
inefficiencies in the OR 
• Decreases in numbers of 
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anaesthesiologists, surgeons, 
nurses 
• Lack of money to support this 
program 
• Increase in morbidity and 
mortality linked to individualistic 
surgical practices 
• Lack of interest in improving 
efficiency 
• Significant problems with the 
culture of the organization 
• Tension between nurses and 
APPs 
• Adverse selection favouring less 
sick patients by some surgeons 
• Resistance in the community to 
the new culture of efficiency 
• Lack of follow-up after discharge 
 
5.3 Differences in UCs according to organizations’ 
sustainability classifications 
Looking at the cases based on their sustainability, there were no significant 
differences seen at the systemic level. However, there were some similarities. For 
example, there were serendipities such as the increase in job opportunities for 
health professionals in each province. There were trade-offs, such as the 
uncertainty of the program’s sustainability in the long term due to budget 
constraints. There were also negative consequences, such as increases in wait 
times due to patients’ preferences. In other words, the key points to classify an 
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organization as a sustainable, moderately sustainable, or unlikely to be sustainable 
seemed not to be linked to systemic elements, although they were essential points 
in all four cases. 
On the other hand, there were noticeable differences in the cases at the 
organizational level. Organizational culture, which encompasses team work, good 
communication, respect for members of the team, and confidence and trust 
between different health professionals, had a positive impact on the outcomes of 
the program. The institutions with programs classified as unlikely to be sustainable 
had many problems in their organizational cultures, which were characterized by 
resistance to moving toward the new culture of efficiency. In addition, they 
preferred the status quo and resisted new approaches and ways of doing things. 
This was especially true for nurses and surgeons who were near retirement. As a 
result, these organizations were struggling with tension and stress that negatively 
affected outcomes.  
The institution classified as moderately sustainable had positive aspects 
that helped it to achieve goals. However, it still had some problems with 
organizational culture in terms of trust, confidence, communication, individualistic 
behaviour and resistance to moving toward a culture based on efficiency. In fact, 
the differences in UCs appear to fall into what we will call here a ‘gradient’. For 
example, if we look at serendipities in terms of a gradient, we see that the 
sustainable case was linked to a cohesive team, an organizational culture based on 
efficiency, and a high level of participation and involvement with the program. 
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The cases classified as unlikely to be sustainable were characterized by a lack of 
those same elements. Meanwhile, the moderately sustainable case had more of 
those elements than the unlikely to be sustainable cases, but fewer than did the 
sustainable case. We have attempted to depict this gradient of key serendipities 
linked to organizations’ sustainability graphically in a way that could potentially 
be applied to other desirable and unanticipated consequences (see Figure 10). 
 
Figure 10 Differences in serendipities across cases based on sustainability:  
team cohesiveness 
 
 
The cases that were unlikely to be sustainable had less cohesive teams, and 
the moderately sustainable case had a more cohesive team, but not to the same 
extent as the sustainable case. 
Sustainable	   Moderately	  
sustainable	  
Unlikely	  sustainable	  
Team	  
cohesiveness	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Looking at trade-offs, the cases that were unlikely to be sustainable had to 
contend with significant resistance to changing the status quo, tension between 
established orthopaedic surgeons and new surgeons, and inefficiency in the OR. 
The sustainable case did not have those unintended consequences (see Figure 11). 
Figure 11 Differences in trade-offs across cases based on sustainability: 
resistance to changing the status quo 
 
 
Finally, negative consequences, such as increases in morbidity and 
mortality due to individualistic surgical practices and lack of involvement of 
nurses and surgeons in the program, were frequently mentioned in the two unlikely 
to be sustainable cases. These consequences were also described by the moderately 
sustainably case, to a lesser extent. In contrast, the sustainable case did not appear 
to be dealing with the same negative consequences (see Figure 12). 
Sustainable	   Moderately	  
sustainable	  
Unlikely	  sustainable	  
Resistance	  to	  changing	  
the	  status	  quo	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Figure 12 Differences in negative consequences across cases based on 
sustainability: increases in morbidity and mortality due to individualistic 
surgical practices 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Sustainable	   Moderately	  
sustainable	  
Unlikely	  sustainable	  
Increase	  in	  morbidity	  
and	  mortality	  due	  to	  
individualis=c	  
surgical	  prac=ces	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Table 13 Differences in UCs across cases based on sustainability:  
organizational level 
 Sustainable Unlikely to be sustainable 
Serendipities • Cohesive team 
work 
• APPs essential 
part of the 
program 
• Organizational 
culture based on 
efficiency 
• High participation 
and involvement 
in this program by 
nurses and 
surgeons 
• No cohesive team 
• No APP 
• No interest in culture of efficiency 
Trade-offs • No tension 
between old and 
new culture of 
efficiency 
• No resistance to 
change 
• No inefficiency in 
the OR 
• Old culture vs. new efficiency culture 
• Significant resistance to changing the 
status quo 
• Significant inefficiency in the OR 
 
Negative 
consequences 
• No influences of 
individual 
practices 
• No lack of 
involvement from 
nurses and 
surgeons 
• Increases in morbidity and mortality due 
to individualistic surgical practices 
• Lack of involvement of nurses and 
surgeons in the program. 
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5.4 Similarities in UCs across cases based on sustainability 
- systemic level 
Even though there were differences in outcomes among the cases, it is also 
interesting that, based on the results of this project, there were a significant 
number of similarities among them at the systemic and organizational levels. 
(Table 12) 
For example, in all the cases the program provided new job opportunities in 
those provinces, whether the cases were successful or not. One fact was clear in all 
the cases; uncertainty regarding the program’s sustainability in the long term due 
to budget constraints was a constant. In addition, the most important negative 
consequence at the systemic level was that the WTMS policy improved HKR wait 
times but increased wait times in other specialties. 
Table 14 Similarities in UCs across cases based on sustainability - systemic 
level 
 Similarities 
Serendipities • New job opportunities 
Trade-offs • Uncertainty regarding the program’s 
sustainability in the long term due to budget 
constraints 
Negative 
consequences 
• Increase in other wait times due to policies 
being focused on HKR 
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5.5 Similarities in UCs across cases based on sustainability 
- organizational level 
Regarding the UCs across cases based on their sustainability at the 
organizational level, there were important serendipities, trade-offs, and negative 
consequences that were very similar among cases.  
For example, in all cases the program that was implemented served as a 
model for other programs in the same institution and other hospitals. The 
uncertainty of the program’s sustainability due to budget constraints in the 
organizations, overwork among nurses, stress, and tension among health 
professionals were some of the most common anticipated and undesirable 
consequences across the cases. Finally, the unanticipated and undesirable 
consequence of increases in wait times due to patients’ preferences was also 
common to all cases (see Table 13). 
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Table 15 Similarities in UCs across cases based on sustainability - 
organizational level 
 Similarities 
Serendipities • Program serving as role model 
Trade-offs • Uncertainty regarding the program’s 
sustainability in the long term due to budget 
constraints. 
• Overwork for nurses 
• Stress 
• Tension among health professionals 
Negative 
consequences 
• Increases in wait times due to patients’ 
preferences.  
• Bottlenecks in the OR (moderately and 
unlikely to be sustainable cases) 
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Chapter 6- Discussion and analysis 
WTMS has been used as strategy to decrease wait times for HKR. 
However, there are significant elements to analyse based on the concept of UCs in 
terms of serendipities, trade-offs and negative consequences. 
1. The first interesting element is that this study found UCs of 
implementing strategies to reduce wait times for total joint 
replacement surgery in accordance with federal benchmark. 
There are UCs at the systemic and organizational level 
(prehospital-hospital and post-hospital level) that were described 
above. 
2. Even though there are differences at the organizational level 
between cases, they have rather more similarities at the systemic 
level in terms of UCs. For example, there were serendipities such 
as the increase in job opportunities for health professionals. 
Regarding trade-offs, there is uncertainty of the program’s 
sustainability in the long term because of budget constraints. 
There are common negative consequences no matter if the case 
was classified as sustainable or not such as increase on wait 
times due to patient’s preferences, increases on wait times due to 
funding has been taking away from some programs and 
redirected toward HKR, inefficiency health policies based on 
inaccurate data. The results show that UCs at the systemic level 
are very similar between all cases, no matter what type of 
strategy was implementing to improve WT. 
On the other hand, there are more differences between cases at 
the organizational level in terms of UCs. There are general and 
specific UCs related to each case based on institutional goals, 
organizational environment and impact of the provincial and 
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local policies on institutions. For example, the sustainable case 
has positive and unexpected consequences such as cohesive team 
in the OR and significant improvements in the culture of the 
organization. However, sustainability and success of the program 
is also questionable due to potential adverse selection favouring 
less sick patients. 
The organizational UCs of WTMS on HKR are more related to 
the culture of the organization and it plays significant role in the 
success of the strategy implemented to improve wait times. In the 
moderate sustainable case and more in the unlikely sustainable 
cases, resistance to change to the new culture of efficiency are 
significant elements that cause negative impact on the 
sustainability of WTMS based on federal benchmark.  
There are similarities between cases at the organizational level: 
Serendipities such as the referral process has been used as a role 
model in other programs, Trade-offs such as tension and stress 
among health professionals due to WTMS program, resistance to 
change. Negative consequences such as increases of wait times 
due to double referral from GPs, increases on wait times related 
to inefficiency in the OR. 
3. The UCs is also related to the type of strategies implemented in 
order to accomplish the Federal mandate.  They are elements that 
are more related to the UCs no matter the case is sustainable or 
not. Those factors should be analyzed based on the determinants 
of the success of WTMS at the contextual and organizational 
levels taking into consideration specific factors: Governance-
Culture-Ressources-Tools. This analysis is not including in this 
study, but it will essential part of the comprehensiveness of the 
UCs. 
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4. Even though not all cases were successful, they improved their 
understanding of the key elements to succeed on any program 
such as team work, cohesiveness, willingness to adapt to new 
strategies and adaptability of the team to achieve new goals in 
the best benefit of patients.  
5. Health policies should be addressed to improve health services 
for the population based on the long term sustainability policies 
rather than short term programs based on politics and public 
opinion. 
6. This study has only one sustainable case based on the federal 
benchmark. However, it is not clear if the results are related to 
improvement on ressources management and efficiency than 
adverse selection. It will be interesting to analyze different 
factors that could cause impact on the outcome and their 
potential unintended consequences. 
6.1 Implications of the study 
First, since there have been, to our knowledge, no other studies of WTMS 
based on the analysis of UCs, this master’s thesis makes a contribution by 
demonstrating the unintended consequences of using WTMS to improve wait 
times for HKR surgeries. Until now, only a limited number of studies have 
focused on this topic, and this project will help pave the way for future studies. 
Second, the review of the literature on UCs was extensive and allowed us to better 
understand the concept of UCs, and their classification and history in relation to 
health services. 
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Even though this thesis project was conducted in three of Canada’s ten 
provinces, we believe the results could be generalized, recognizing that there are 
social, political and economic contexts in each case that demonstrate the 
particularities of their province. Finally, this thesis contributes ideas for new 
potential research topics, such as: unintended consequences at the level of 
individuals in healthcare organizations, success factors for sustainability and the 
potential unintended consequences of the WTMS program, and finally, analysis of 
the UCs of health policies. 
6.1.1 Future directions 
The following are potential areas of further research into the understanding 
of unintended consequences of using WTMS to improve wait times. 
Unintended consequences at the individual level of healthcare organizations 
Since this thesis was mainly focused on the systemic and organizational 
levels, we could not analyze some consequences at the individual level. However, 
we found enough elements to support conducting further studies of this particular 
issue, and it will be especially important to study the impact on GPs’ behaviour of 
implementing WTMS. 
Success factors of sustainability and its potential unintended consequences 
Further research could analyze the success factors of sustainability and the 
potential unintended consequences of the WTMS program in order to explore the 
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relationship between those success factors and the program’s unintended 
consequences.  
Analysis of the unintended consequences of health policies 
Based on our review of the literature on unintended consequences, it would 
be valuable to study the potential unintended consequences of using other, 
different types of strategies or policies, either in the Canadian healthcare system or 
in other healthcare systems. We believe the analysis of unintended consequences 
should be one of the steps to consider in any planning process, not only at the 
micro level, but also at the macro level. 
6.2 Limitations of the study 
6.2.1 External validity      
We followed the recommendations advising caution in generalizing the 
results of qualitative studies to other contexts (Yin, 2003) and we respected the 
principles of similarity, robustness, and explanation (Contandriopoulos, 2005). In 
this thesis project, we applied qualitative analysis in the Canadian context in three 
different provinces to enhance similarity, robustness and explanation, in order to 
be better able to generalize events from the case study to the rest of the country. 
However, it is evident that there are differences among the provinces that could 
decrease the external validity of this project’s results. Moreover, variations in the 
social, political and economic contexts in each of the ten provinces in Canada 
could have different impacts on the potential unintended consequences of using 
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WTMS to improve wait times for HKR surgeries. The framework used in this 
project not only supported the results and improved their external validity, but also 
reaffirmed the importance of doing more case studies in the future (Yin, 2003). 
The results were validated by key informants in each case study. 
6.2.2 Reliability     
To minimize errors and biases in the study (Yin, 2003), we created a strict 
and organized database and wrote case study notes after visiting each case, to 
decrease bias and increase reliability. In addition, the case study protocol was 
designed to maintain a chain of evidence. Finally, the UC framework designed for 
this study was validated by a panel of external health manager experts, and the 
study was also evaluated in academic meetings, where it was reviewed by external 
observers.  
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Chapter 7 - Conclusion 
The implementation of strategies to improve wait times at the national and 
local levels never took into consideration any potential unintended consequences. 
In fact, policies were developed without any plan to include analysis of UCs. For 
example, policy-makers did not consider the budget required to sustain the 
program in the long term, nor the costs of the administrative team, data collection, 
and orientation for GPs before the program was implemented.  
The definition of program sustainability should be reassessed in order to 
improve outcomes. Even though in this project we found one organization that 
could be defined as sustainable and successful, the fact that they were using 
adverse selection, which improved their results, should be a concern. In addition, 
the definition of sustainability was based on increasing volumes to reduce the 
numbers of patients waiting for surgery, but this approach was forcing institutions 
to adopt some particular ways of doing things that should be evaluated, as well.  
More volumes do not necessarily translate into efficiency and sustainability 
just because they achieve the federal goals. Moreover, a sustainable strategy 
should take into consideration the complexity of cases, and the economic, social 
and human factors that affect any strategy in any organization. Furthermore, the 
focus should not be only on improving wait times, but also on avoiding some UCs 
and limiting them. 
In this thesis, we propose a ‘cycle of unintended consequences’. We 
consider that the strategies implemented have unintended consequences in terms of 
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serendipities, trade-offs, and negative consequences. In fact, there are unintended 
consequences at every level of the healthcare organization, and they interact 
cyclically with each other, causing either positive or negative impacts on 
outcomes. Moreover, consequences at the systemic level cause direct and indirect 
consequences at the organizational and individual levels, as well. These 
relationships among different levels of the organization impact the outcomes either 
positively or negatively (see Figure 13). 
 
Figure 13 Cycle of unintended consequences linked to WTMS 
 
 
Finally, health planning should take into consideration not only different 
steps to develop successful strategies in health care. Decision-makers should 
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analyze potential unintended consequences in terms of serendipities, trade-offs, 
and negative consequences in order to improve positive results, avoid negative 
ones, and decrease the impacts of undesirable and inevitable consequences (see 
Figure 14). 
In this thesis, we propose this scheme as a useful tool in the healthcare 
planning process to achieve good outcomes while taking into consideration 
potential unintended consequences at the systemic, organizational and individual 
levels. 
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Figure 14 Planning process in healthcare organizations taking into account 
the analysis of potential UCs 
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